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THE SUPREME COURT SETS THE STANDARD: DRUG
TESTING AT THE INTERSCHOLASTIC LEVEL
Paul M. Anderson'
High school student Lindsay Earls was a member of the show
choir, marching band, academic team, and National Honor
Society. Daniel James wanted to be a member of the academic
team. Because these activities were outside of the classroom and
extracurricular, both students were subject to a drug testing
policy. The policy required all students in middle or high school
to consent to the testing in order to participate in any
extracurricular activity-even if the activity had no athletic or
physical component.
Like so many school districts across the country, the
Tecumseh School District set up the policy in an effort to combat
what it perceived as a growing drug problem among its students
even though there was limited evidence that students like
Lindsay and Daniel were actually drug users. In fact, most high
school officials would argue that students like these are actually
less likely to use drugs, because if they do and are caught using
drugs, they will lose their ability to participate anyway.
Because Lindsay and Daniel would not consent to the testing,
both were barred from participating in what were clearly
academic-related extracurricular activities. Who knows what
impact their participation may have had on their future
development as they prepared for college and a career after
school? The school district said that the policy was voluntary,
yet, the district made clear that if a student did not consent to the
testing, that student could not participate in any extracurricular
1

Associate Director,

National Sports Law

Institute

of Marquette

University Law School where he is an Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law.
Professor Anderson is the Editor of the JOURNAL OF LEGAL ASPECTS OF SPORT and
the Supervisor of the MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW. He is also the Chair and

founder of Marquette's Sports Law Alumni Association and the Vice-Chair and
Program Coordinator for the Sports & Entertainment Law Section of the State Bar
of Wisconsin.

HeinOnline -- 4 Tex. Rev. Ent. & Sports L. 1 2003

2

TEXAS REVIEW OF
ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW

[Vol. 4:1

activities, activities that they otherwise could voluntarily join.
Moreover, because Lindsay and Daniel were not drug users, they
did not feel they should be forced to submit to an invasive drug
testing policy.
Along with their parents, Lindsay and Daniel felt that the fact
that they were basically being forced to consent to the testing
program in exchange for being allowed to participate in their
extracurricular activities was too much. They argued that the
drug testing policy itself was a violation of their rights
guaranteed by the United States Constitution-in essence, the
right to be free from illegal searches and seizures.
Lindsay and Daniel were not the first students to contest such
drug testing policies. For the better part of the last decade and a
half, students all over the country have argued that similar drug
testing policies are unconstitutional. In response to these claims,
the United States Supreme Court has made two important and
controversial rulings regarding drug testing of students at the
interscholastic level.
This article will not debate or evaluate whether the Supreme
Court has been correct in either of these decisions. Instead, it
will present a unique look at the development of what will be
termed a "judicial model" that courts have used when they review
drug testing policies that involve students at the interscholastic
level. The focus will be on an in-depth analysis of the cases
involving reviews of these drug testing policies, followed by an
analysis of whether the latest Supreme Court decision in this
area has followed this model.
I. Introduction
Before analyzing the development of the judicial model used to
evaluate drug testing programs, it is important to provide certain
clarifications to the reader.
A. Interscholastics and Privileges
Initially, it bears noting that the interscholastic level that is
discussed in this paper can generally be understood to include
students in grades six through twelve. This covers most middle
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to high school levels of extracurricular participation and will

cover most of the drug testing policies that are discussed in the
following pages.
It is also important to understand that participation in
athletics and other extracurricular
activities at the
interscholastic level is a privilege and not a right.2 This means
that students do not have a property right in such participation,
and thus cannot sue a school district or other entity merely
because they are barred from participation. Instead, in the cases
that will be discussed, students are claiming that the drug testing
procedures themselves violate their privacy rights, and that this
violation then keeps them from participating because they will
not agree to be tested.
B. Drug Testing as a Search
This article presents an analysis of the constitutionality of
drug testing in many different situations.
As one court
explained, "[w]henever a constitutional challenge is made to any
search or investigation, a preliminary question must be whether
state action is involved. If a search is being conducted by a
private entity and not under the color of state law, then it is not
subject to the identical scrutiny to which actions of public officials
are subject."3 Moreover, "[t]he United States Supreme Court has

held expressly that the Fourth Amendment applies to the officials
of local public schools."4 Therefore, searches done at the public
school level will always involve state action and so will be subject
to constitutional scrutiny.
Any court will find that a drug testing policy is a search. As
the United States Supreme Court has stated, "[a] 'search' occurs
when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to

2

Todd v. Rush County Sch., 983 F. Supp. 799, 806 (S.D. Ind. 1997)

("Participation in extracurricular programs is voluntary and a privilege; any
student joining these activities is subject to regulation beyond that of a nonparticipant.").
3 Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 730
F.Supp. 759,
762-763 (S.D. Tex. 1989), affd, 930 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1991).
4 Id.
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consider reasonable is infringed." 5 The lawsuits that will be
discussed present claims that various drug testing policies are
violations of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and its prohibitions against illegal searches and
seizures. The Fourth Amendment states that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but only upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
Following this language, any search conducted by a public
official must be based "upon probable cause and a warrant, or at
least some form of individualized suspicion of the individual
being searched." 7 The focus of this article will be on cases that
have reviewed situations where these requirements are modified.
II. Early Developments in the Special Needs Doctrine
In order to understand the current judicial model used to
review drug testing programs at the interscholastic level, it is
first necessary to understand the evolution of judicial review of
these policies over time. This early analysis will begin with the
United States Supreme Court's early delineation of the special
needs doctrine, move to an early case that reviewed a drug
testing policy applicable to athletes, add further clarification from
the Supreme Court, and end with a look at one of the earliest
cases dealing with a drug testing policy applicable to
extracurricular participants.

5
6

7

United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Paul Anderson, Drug Testing in Amateur Sports in the US, in DRUGS

AND DOPING IN SPORT: SOCIO-LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 205, 205-24 (John O'Leary, Ed.

2001).

HeinOnline -- 4 Tex. Rev. Ent. & Sports L. 4 2003

2003]

DRUG TESTING AT THE INTERSCHOLASTIC LEVEL

A. The Genesis of Special Needs
The term "special needs" first appeared in Justice Blackmun's
concurrence in New Jersey v. T.L.O. 8 In this case, a high school
student was taken to the vice principal's office after a teacher saw
her smoking in the lavatory.9 After the student denied she had
been smoking, the vice principal demanded to see the student's
purse and found a pack of cigarettes and rolling papers commonly
associated with the use of marijuana. 10 He then searched further
and found marijuana, a pipe, plastic bags, money, a list with the
names of other students that owed her money, and two letters
implicating her in marijuana dealings."
Before the Supreme Court the focus of the case was on the
nature of the search and whether it was a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. 12 Initially, the Court determined that the Fourth
Amendment applies to searches conducted by school authorities
on school grounds. 13 The Court then assessed the nature of the
particular search by balancing "the individual's legitimate
expectations of privacy and personal security" against "the
government's need for effective methods to deal with breaches of
public order."14 The Court noted that:
the accommodation of the privacy interests of
schoolchildren with the substantial need of teachers
and administrators for freedom to maintain order in
the schools does not require strict adherence to the
requirement that searches be based on probable
cause to believe that the subject of the search has
violated or is violating the law. Rather, the legality
of a search of a student should depend simply on the
reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the

8

469 U.S. 325 (1985).

9 Id. at 328.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id. at

332.

13 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at
337.
14

Id.
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search. 5
The Court added that this focus on reasonableness "will spare
teachers and school administrators the necessity of schooling
themselves in the niceties of probable cause and permit them to
regulate their conduct according to the dictates of reason and
common sense."16 Reviewing the reasonableness of the search by
school officials, the Court then found that "the search was in no
sense unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes.
Justice Blackmun went further in his concurrence. While
noting that "the Court correctly states that we have recognized
limited exceptions to the probable-cause requirement '[where] a
careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests
that the public interest is best served' by a lesser standard," he
reiterated that this test should only be applied "in those
exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and
probable-cause requirement impracticable." 8 This is the genesis
of the "special needs" doctrine.
The Supreme Court subsequently adopted the "special needs"
analysis in two cases in 1987. The first case, O'Connorv. Ortega,
involves a public employer's work-related search of its employee's
office while the employee was on paid administrative leave. 19 A
majority of the Court found that the employee had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his office, subject to Fourth Amendment
Id. at 340.
Id. at 343. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals explained in Schaill v.
Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1314 (7th Cir. 1988):
In T.L.O. the Court stressed that a school official's primary
mission is not to ferret out crime, but is instead to teach
students in a safe and secure learning environment. School
teachers and administrators should not be required to keep
abreast of the most recent developments in fourth amendment
jurisprudence; nor should they be required to retain counsel
and proceed through the courts each time they desire to obtain
further information regarding a potential violation of school
rules.
17 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 343.
18 Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
15
16

19 480 U.S. 709, 714 (1987).
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protection. °
The Court also noted that there are some
circumstances in which it has recognized that a warrant
requirement is unsuitable to a particular search, and adopted
Justice Blackmun's language from T.L.O., because, at times,
"special needs" will allow for a search without a warrant.2 '
The companion case of Griffin v. Wisconsin22 involved the
warrantless search of Griffin's house while he was on probation
after being convicted of resisting arrest, disorderly conduct and
obstructing an officer.23 The case focused on the reasonableness
of the search of Griffin's house based on a tip that he might be in
violation of his probation because he had a gun in the house.24 In
affirming the judgment of the Wisconsin Supreme Court that the
search was reasonable, the court again followed Justice
Blackmun's analysis noting that in limited circumstances, a
search unsupported by either warrant or probable cause can be
constitutional when "special needs" other than the normal need
for law enforcement provide sufficient justification.25
Based on this special needs analysis, school districts have an
extraordinary power to search students in public schools when
their responsibility to protect in the students from any health and
safety hazards might mandate that a search is necessary. This
special needs analysis also becomes the first part of the judicial
model used by courts to review drug testing policies.
B. Athletics
One of the earliest cases dealing with the validity of a drug
testing policy testing students at the interscholastic level began
in 1986 when the Tippecanoe County School Corporation (TSC),
implemented a drug testing policy requiring all students
interested in participating in athletics to consent to drug
testing. 26

21

Id. at 725.
Id. at 720.

22

483 U.S. 868 (1987).

20

23 Id. at 870-71.
25

Id. at 873.
Id. at 873.

26

Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1310.

24
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Under the testing procedure, a school official of the same sex
and a student who was selected for testing went to a school
bathroom.27 The student was given an empty specimen bottle and
allowed to enter a lavatory stall and close the door in order to
produce a sample. 28 Although the students being tested were not
under direct visual observation while producing the sample, the
water in the toilet was tinted to prevent the student from
substituting a different sample, and the school official waited
outside the stall to listen for the normal sounds of urination.29 In
addition, the official was to check the temperature of the sample
by hand in order to assure its genuineness. 0 Students who tested
positive for certain drugs could be barred from participating in
high school athletics.'
In 1987, two student athletes sued TSC claiming that the
policy violated the Fourth Amendment.2 After the district court
upheld the constitutionality of the policy, the students appealed
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.3
The Seventh Circuit began its review pointing to the T.L.O.
case, noting that "[tihe Supreme Court has ruled that the
probable cause and warrant requirements are not applicable to
school searches," 4 and therefore, "school searches should be
judged under the standard of 'reasonableness[ I under all the
The court then looked at the competing
circumstances.' 35
interests of the parties to see whether the policy was reasonable.
The court also recognized that such searches are "more likely
to be permissible in circumstances where an individual has
diminished expectations of privacy."3 6 On the other side of the
equation, the government's interests furthered by a particular
search must be "weighty, and generally of a nature that
27
28
29
30

Id. at 1311.
Id.
Id.
Id.

32

Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1311.
Id.

33

Id.

31

34 Id. at 1315.
35 Id. at 1314 (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 369).
36

Id. at 1317.
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alternate, less intrusive means of detection would not sufficiently
serve the government's ends."37
The court turned to an analysis of the student athletes'
privacy interests. It recognized that interscholastic athletics
have extensive requirements imposed on student participants
from eligibility and grade requirements, to training rules and
prohibitions on smoking, drinking and drug use. 8 In addition,
high school athletes are aware of drug testing at the college and
Olympic level and of the high profile suspensions of athletes at
these levels on the basis of positive drug tests.39 Although
students had to consent to the drug testing in order to participate
in athletics, such participation is not a right, instead it "is a
benefit carrying with it enhanced prestige and status in the
student community," and it is not unreasonable to couple these
benefits with an obligation to be tested. 40 Given these factors, the
court found it implausible that student athletes "would have
strong expectations of privacy with respect to urine tests."4
The court then looked at the government's interest furthered
by the drug testing policy. It noted that drug use is a particular
health and safety concern for student athletes because, "[d]ue to
alterations of mood, reductions of motor coordination and changes
in the perception of pain attributable to drug use, the health and
safety of athletes was particularly threatened." 42 In addition, due
to their high visibility and leadership roles, drug use "by this
widely admired group is likely to affect the behavior of others."43
Therefore, TSC had a "substantial interest" in implementing its
44
drug testing policy.
The court also discussed the plaintiffs arguments that the
school should have used a less intrusive method of searching than
drug testing. The court disagreed, noting that "alternative
37 Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1318.
38

Id.

" Id. at 1319.
Id. at 1319-20.
41 Id. at 1319.
40

42 Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1320.
43 Id.

44 Id.

at 1321.
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methods of investigation would not adequately serve the school's
interest in detection and deterrence of drug use," because, "[t]he
school's choice of appropriate means to combat this health and
disciplinary problem will not be overturned unless unreasonable
in light of available alternatives," and "random testing may be
particularly effective as a deterrent" to students.
In the end, the Seventh Circuit found that the TSC drug
testing policy was reasonable and did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.4"
C. Further Supreme Court Clarification
Two years after the Schaill decision, the United States
Supreme Court again added to the special needs analysis in the
cases of Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association47 and
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab.8
The Skinner case dealt with federal railroad administration
regulations requiring railroad employees to submit to drug
testing after major accidents or violations of specific safety
rules. 49 The employees sued, claiming that the policy was a
violation of their constitutional rights.50 Following the same
"special needs" analysis referred to in T.L.O., Griffin, and
O'Conner, the Court noted that "our cases establish that where a
Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special governmental needs,
beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary to
balance the individual's privacy expectations against the
Government's interests to determine whether it is impractical to
require a warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the
particular context." 51 The Court then began its analysis by noting
that "[tihe Government's interest in regulating the conduct of
railroad employees to ensure safety... presents 'special needs'
beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from
45

Id.
Id. at 1322.
47 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
48 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
49 Skinner, 489 U.S. at
606.
50 Id. at 612.
51 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66 (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619-20).
46
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the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements."2
Having established that there was a special need, the Court
balanced the interests involved, in a similar way as was done in
Schaill, and found that
the compelling Government interests served by the
FRA's regulations would be significantly hindered if
railroads were required to point to specific facts
giving rise to a reasonable suspicion of impairment
before testing a given employee. In view of our
conclusion
that... the
toxicological
testing
contemplated by the regulations is not an undue
infringement on the justifiable expectations of
privacy of covered employees, the Government's
compelling interests outweigh privacy concerns."
In the companion case, Von Raab, the U.S. Customs Service
forced employees who were involved in drug interdiction, were
required to carry firearms, or were required to handle classified
material, to submit to a drug screening program.54 Some of these
employees sued claiming that the drug policy was an illegal
search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.55 The Court
initially found that the government's substantial interest in
deterring drug use among Customs agents was no less than its
interests in the Skinner case and presented a "special need."56
Therefore, after balancing the interests involved, the Court found
that "the Government has demonstrated that its compelling
interests in safeguarding our borders and the public safety
outweigh the privacy expectations of employees," 57 and so the
testing program was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.58

52

Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620 (quoting Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873-74).

53 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633.
54 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 660-61.

" Id. at 663.
56 Id. at
666.
57 Id. at 677.
58 Id.
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D. ExtracurricularActivities
In the same year, one of the first cases reviewing the validity
of a testing program applicable to all students in any
extracurricular activity was decided. In 1988, the East Chambers
Consolidated Independent School District in Texas implemented
a drug testing program that tested all students from grades six to
twelve who wished to participate in school-sponsored
extracurricular activities. 59 Brent Brooks, a student participating
in the Future Farmers of America program, sued claiming that
the policy violated the Fourth Amendment. °
Under the policy, students were brought to the principal's
office where they were confronted by the principal and a school
nurse.6 The student was then asked whether he or she was
using any drugs that might cause a positive test result.2 If the
student answered affirmatively, the principal would leave the
room and the student would disclose what drugs they were taking
that would make the test result become positive.6 3 Regardless,
after being questioned, all students were told to go into the
bathroom in the principal's office to produce the sample.64 The
student was not to flush the toilet until after the sample was
given to the nurse. 5
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas, Galveston Division, began its review of the case noting
that according to Von Raab, the analysis under the Fourth
Amendment begins by determining whether the conduct is a
search, and then moves to whether the conduct is reasonable. 6
As to the first part of this analysis, again following Von Raab, the
69

Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 730 F.Supp. 759,

760 (S.D. Tex 1989), affd, 930 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1991).
60 Id.
61 Id. at 762.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Brooks, 730 F.Supp. at
764.

65 During the course of the litigation, the school district revised the policy.
However, the changes only had to do with the timing of the testing and are not
part of this discussion of the case.
66 Id.
at 763 (citing Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656).
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court found that "without a doubt" the drug testing program was
a search.6 7
The court then turned to an analysis of its
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.
Unlike the Schaill case, this court followed a different portion
of T.L.O. and found that the reasonableness analysis involves two
parts: (1) .'whether the ... action was justified at its inception,'
and (2) "whether the search as actually conducted 'was
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified
the interference in the first place.' ' 8 Although never following
the special needs language from T.L.O., the court recognized that
the school district could show a special interest justifying the
testing program if "it were shown that participants in extracurricular activities are much more likely to use drugs than nonparticipants, or that drug use by participants interfered with the
school's educational mission much more seriously than does drug
use by non-participants."69 Instead of demonstrating that the
students tested were more likely to use drugs, the court found
that "logic would dictate that students who participate in
athletics and other extra-curricular activities are, in fact, less
likely to use drugs and alcohol, if only because Texas law forbids
students who fail courses from participating in extra-curricular
activities, and presumably, heavy drug or alcohol use will have a
negative impact on academic performance."7 °
In what other courts will describe as a look at the character of
the intrusion caused by the drug testing procedure, this court
found that the drug testing policy in this case was "the most
intrusive of any school district in Texas. It tests the widest range
of students, grades seven through twelve-originally grades six
through twelve-participating in extra-curricular activities,"
7
which was "over half the student body." 1
Furthermore, in looking at the effectiveness of the policy in
reaching the school district's goals of combating the problem of
drug use, the court noted that the policy was not tailored to test
67
68
69

Brooks, 730 F.Supp. at 763.
Id. at 764 (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 343).
Brooks, 730 F.Supp. at 764.

70

Id.

71

Id. at 765.
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those who were most likely to use drugs.72 Instead, without
discussing the extent of the students' privacy interests, the court
stated "[a] program that simply encourages drug-using students
to give up activities outside of school is not sufficient justification
73
for ignoring students' reasonable expectations of privacy.
Finally, the court specifically disagreed with the Schaill
decision because this court thought that it was more strictly
following the Von Raab and Skinner decisions as it determined
that the school district's interest in support of the testing
program was "much less than the governmental interest that the
[Supreme] Court found compelling in Skinner and Von Raab.74
The court argued that the Schaill court might have reached a
different decision if it had been decided after Skinner and Von
Raab. Still, it also recognized that "the evidence before the
Tippecanoe district court was significantly different than the
evidence at bar, with the program approved by the Seventh
Circuit considerably more limited than the one before this
Court." 5
The court ended by stating that "the school environment does
not require an automatic forfeiture of certain rights and privacy
expectations," and that "attendance does not trigger an instant
diminution of rights.7 6 It granted the parents an injunction
barring the district from using the policy because it was a
violation of the Fourth Amendment.7
E. Analysis
The Schaill case is an early example of a court's analysis of a
drug testing policy involving high school students involved in
extracurricular activities, here interscholastic athletics. While
the court does not explicitly use a balancing test or assess special
needs, this early case begins to show how courts will look at the

72

Id.

73 Id.

74 Brooks, 730 F.Supp. at 766.
75 Id.
76

Id.

77 Id.
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competing interests of students and school officials when a drug
test is involved. In finding that the test was reasonable, the
Schaill court carefully looked at the privacy interests of the
students involved and weighed these against the government's
interest in enforcing the testing policy. Interestingly, while the
court notes that the students were required to submit to drug
testing "only as a condition of participation in an extracurricular
activity-athletics," it seems to foreshadow the extracurricular
cases to come when it says that "[riandom testing of athletes does
not necessarily imply random testing of band members or the
chess team."78 The court also argues that the considerations
discussed "distinguish athletes from members of the general
school population. Our decision today should not be read as
endorsing urine testing of all students attending a school." 9 This
article will analyze whether the court's thoughts in this regard
are correct.
It is also important to note, as the Schaill court so noted,
"participation in athletics at the high school level in itself is a
privilege and not a right." 0 Therefore, even though courts will
analyze the student's privacy interests in the drug testing cases,
these interests should not be equated with some sort of property
right in participation itself. The question as to whether nonathletic forms of extracurricular participation in sports will also
be given only privileged status will be examined throughout this
article.
Von Raab and Skinner add to the analysis by showing that
according to the United States Supreme Court, drug testing
programs seemingly should be analyzed by first assessing
whether there is a special need obviating the necessity for a
warrant based on reasonable suspicion. If such a special need is
found to exist, then the court assesses the reasonableness of the
search involved by balancing the individual's privacy rights
against the government's interests in conducting the testing.
This basic test has been redefined over the years in its
application to many groups-particularly interscholastic students
78 Schaill, 864

F.2d at 1319.
1319 n.10.
Anderson, supra note 7, at 209.

79 Id. at
80
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at public schools.
The Brooks court seems to follow Von Raab, Skinner, and
T.L.O., but does not focus on the special needs doctrine. Instead,
Brooks focuses on the lack of evidence of a particular drug abuse
problem among the students tested-those participating in
extracurricular activities. Brooks also would not equate simple
attendance at a public school with some sort of reduction in
privacy rights. As will be demonstrated in further cases, the
Brooks courts' interpretation of the way in which such policies
should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment is incorrect.
III. Delineation of the Standard
The cases discussed so far provide the background to an
understanding of the judicial model eventually followed in the
Earls decision. However, while the early cases provided an
overview of the model itself, the Supreme Court provided more
explicit direction in 1995 and 1997.
A. Drug Testing of Student Athletes
In 1995, in the seminal case of Vernonia School District47J v.
Acton, 81 the Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of a
drug testing program applied to student athletes at the high
school level. This is the first case to specifically set out the way
81

515 U.S. 646 (1995).

Id. at 648.

For more in depth discussion of the Acton case, see, for
example, Rhett Traband, The Acton Case: The Supreme Court's Gradual Sacrifice
of Privacy Rights on the Altar of the War on Drugs, 100 DICK. L. REV. 1 (1995);
Recent Development, K Vernonia School District47J v. Acton: Suspicionless Drug
Testing Of Student-Athletes Held Reasonable Under The Supreme Court's
Balancing Test, 22 J. CONTEMP. L. 281 (1996); George M. Dery III, The Coarsening
Of Our National Manners: The Supreme Court's Failure To Protect Privacy
Interests Of Schoolchildren-VernoniaSchool District47j v. Acton, 29 Suffolk U. L.
Rev. 693 (1995); Donald Crowley, Student Athletes And Drug Testing, 6 MARQ.
SPORTS L.J. 95 (1995); Paul Porvaznik, Sports Law: When Drug Testing Violates
The Student Athlete's Right To Privacy, 5 J. ART & ENT. LAW 173 (1995); Nancy D.
Wagman, Casenote, Are We Becoming A Society Of Suspects? Vernonia School
District 47J v. Acton: Examining Random, Suspicionless Drug Testing Of Public
School Athletes, 3 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 325 (1996); Robert L. Roshkoff,
Casenote, University Of Colorado v. Derdeyn: The Constitutionality Of Random,
82
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a court will review a drug testing policy at the interscholastic

level.
It is important to keep in mind that even though the case
dealt with a policy testing only student athletes, as the Schaill
court noted, athletics are also an extracurricular activity.
Therefore, the Acton case provides the foundation for
understanding later cases involving other extracurricular
activities.
In the mid-1980s, teachers and administrators in the
Vernonia School District noticed a sharp increase in student drug
use. Alongside this increase was an increase in disciplinary
problems at the school.83 The school district also found that
student athletes were both users and leaders of the drug
culture.84 This caused particular concern as administrators were
convinced that drug use among athletes could lead to sportsrelated injuries. 85 Initially, the district responded by increasing
awareness and educational programs warning of the dangers
associated with drug use. But the problem persisted. 6
Eventually, the district implemented a drug testing policy
that applied to all students participating in athletics. 87 Each
student was required to sign a consent form, consenting to the
random urinalysis testing policy. 88 During the test, each student
would enter a locker room with an adult monitor to produce a
sample.8 9 Boys would produce the sample while standing fully
clothed at a urinal with their back to the monitor. 90 Girls would
produce the sample in a bathroom stall with the monitor standing
outside the door. 91 The monitor would then check the sample for
Suspicionless Urinalysis Drug-Testing Of College Athletes, 3 VILL. SPORTS & ENT.
L.J. 361 (1996); Stephen L. Wasby, The Road Not Taken: Judicial Federalism,
School Athletes, And Drugs, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1699 (1996).
83 Acton, 515 U.S. at 649.
84 Id.
Id.
Id.
87 Acton, 515 U.S. at 650.

85
86

88
89
90
91

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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temperature and tampering. 9 While a positive test did not result
in any criminal penalties, a second positive test could result in
suspension of the student from participation in athletics.93
In 1991, seventh grader James Acton wanted to play football
but refused to sign the consent forms. 4 As a result, he was not
allowed to participate. 95 The Actons then sued the school district,
claiming that the drug testing policy violated the Fourth
Amendment.96
The District Court denied the Acton's claims on the merits
and dismissed the action. 97 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit then reversed, holding that the policy
violated the Fourth Amendment. "9 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to review the case. 99
The Court began its review stating that in following the
Fourth
Amendment,
"the
ultimate
measure
of the
1
constitutionality of a governmental search is 'reasonableness."' 00
This reasonableness "' is judged by balancing its intrusion on the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of
legitimate governmental interests."' 101
In addition to this reasonableness test, the Court also
reiterated that the warrant and probable cause requirements of
the Fourth Amendment do not need to be followed when "special
needs" make these requirements impracticable. 01 2 Contrary to the
Brooks determination that "the school environment does not
require an automatic forfeiture of certain rights and privacy
expectations, ' ' 3 the Supreme Court pointed to its decision in
9'Acton, 515 U.S. at 650.
93 Id. at 651.
94

Id.

95 Id.
96

Id.

97 Acton,

515 U.S. at 651.

98 Id.
99 Id.

100 Id. at 652.

1o1Id. at 652-53 (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)).
102 Acton, 515 U.S.at 653 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873
(1987)).
103

Brooks, 730 F.Supp. at 766.
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T.L. 0. wherein it found that such special needs exist in the public
school context because the requirement of a warrant "'would
unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal
disciplinary procedures [that are] needed,' and would undercut
'the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom
to maintain order in the schools."0 4 Also, following Skinner and
Von Raab, the Court noted that it had sustained such
suspicionless searches to conduct drug testing in the past, and so
the requirement of individualized suspicion was not mandatory in
this case. 10 5
The Court then began going through the reasonableness
balancing test. As it described, the "first factor to be considered
is the nature of the privacy interest upon which the search here
at issue intrudes."0 6 This privacy interest must be "legitimate"
and may depend on the individual's legal relationship with the
State.107
Central to this issue in the present case was the fact that the
individuals tested were students who were "committed to the
temporary custody of the State as schoolmaster.' 0 8 While at
school, "the teachers and administrators of those schools stand in
loco parentis over the children entrusted to them."0 9 In addition,
"while children assuredly do not 'shed their constitutional
rights ... at the schoolhouse gate,' the nature of those rights is
what is appropriate for children in school." 110 Therefore, public
school students already have a lesser degree of self-determination
and privacy than other individuals in general and other students
in particular. This privacy interest is further diminished because
they are subject to vaccinations and medical exams due to the
school's custodial relationship over them."'
Student athletes have an even lesser expectation of privacy.

107

Acton, 515 U.S. at 653 (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340, 341).
Acton, 515 U.S. at 653-54.
Id. at 654.
Id.

108

Id.

109

Id.

104
105

106

110 Id. at 655-56 (quoting Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864
F.2d 1309, 1318 (7h Cir. 1988)).
i Acton, 515 U.S. at 656.
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As the Schaill court noted, there is an element of communal
undress to athletics 112 and athletes "voluntarily subject
themselves to a degree of regulation even higher than that
imposed on students generally."113 These regulations include
preseason physical exams, acquisition of insurance coverage,
maintenance of minimum grade point averages, and rules as to
dress and training hours. As the Court explained, "students who
voluntarily participate in school athletics have reason to expect
intrusions upon normal rights and privileges, including
' 114
privacy.
Having determined that students in public schools have a
lower expectation of privacy, and that student athletes have even
lower expectations of privacy, the court turned to the character of
the intrusion onto these lowered, albeit legitimate, privacy rights.
The Skinner Court had also analyzed urinalysis testing finding
that "the degree of intrusion depends upon the manner in which
production of the urine sample is monitored.""' In the present
case, male students remained fully clothed while they produced
the sample with their backs turned toward the monitor, while
female students produced samples behind a closed stall door
while the monitor waited outside. According to the Court,
"[t]hese conditions are nearly identical to those typically
encountered in public restrooms, which men, women, and
especially school children use daily," and so the privacy interests
compromised by the testing are at best "negligible." 6
The Court then turned to the other aspect of the privacy
interest involved, the information such testing discloses. The
Court found it significant that the testing program only looked for
drugs, and that the drugs searched for do not vary according to
the student being tested. 1 7 Also, the results of the test were kept
confidential and not used in any way for criminal sanctions." 8
112

Id. at 657 (quoting Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1318).

113 Acton, 515 U.S. at 657.
114
115
116

Id.
Id. at 658 (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626).
Acton, 515 U.S. at 658.

117

Id.

118

Id.
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The Actons argued that the policy was particularly invasive
because students were required to provide information about
their current medical history before being tested. However,
making an explicit reading of the testing policy, the Court argued
that students could provide this information confidentially,
therefore, this "invasion of privacy was not significant" either. 119
The Court then turned to an analysis of both the "nature and
immediacy of the governmental concern at issue here, and the

efficacy of this means for meeting

it."12

°

In past cases, the Court

2
characterized such governmental concerns as "compelling.' 1
However, in this case, it noted that this "compelling state
interest" is not some "fixed, minimum quantum of governmental
concern;" instead, such an interest must appear "important
enough to justify the particular search at hand, in light of other
factors that show the search to be relatively intrusive upon a
1 22
genuine expectation of privacy.
Examining the nature of the governmental interest involved,
the Court agreed that the Vernonia School District was faced
with an important governmental interest. Drug use by children
is a serious problem and "[sichool years are the time when the
physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs are most
severe," because, "'children grow chemically dependent more
quickly than adults, and their record of recovery is depressingly
poor. 1 2 3 Moreover, drug use by students disrupts the educational
process and harms the very children for whom the school "has
124 Of
undertaken a special responsibility of care and direction."
utmost importance, the policy was applied to student athletes
"where the risk of immediate physical harm to the drug user or
125
those with whom he is playing his sport is particularly high.'
Next, the Court looked at the immediacy of the school
district's concern. The Court would not question the district

Id. at 659.
Id. at 660.
121Acton, 515 U.S. at 660.
119
120

122

Id. at 661.

123

Id.
Id. at 662.
Id.

124
125

HeinOnline -- 4 Tex. Rev. Ent. & Sports L. 21 2003

22

TExAS REVIEW OF
ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW

[Vol. 4:1

court's assessment of the epidemic nature of the drug problem
among students in the school district, as it found that
"a large segment of the student body, particularly
those involved in interscholastic athletics, was in a
state of rebellion," that "disciplinary actions had
reached epidemic proportions," and that "the
rebellion was being fueled by alcohol and drug abuse
as well as by the student's misperceptions about the
drug culture."126
This was an "immediate crisis of greater proportions" than
existed in either Skinner or Von Raab.27
Finally, the Court looked to the efficacy of the drug testing
program in addressing the drug problem. The Court found that
"a drug problem largely fueled by the 'role model' effect of
athletes' drug use, and of particular danger to athletes, is
effectively addressed by making sure that athletes do not use
drugs.' ' 8 Contrary to the Actons' suggestion, the school district
did not need to find the least intrusive means possible to reach its
goal of reducing drug use among students. Instead, "[wie have
repeatedly refused to declare that only the 'least intrusive' search
practicable can be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 2' 9
After balancing all of the factors discussed, the Court
concluded that the drug testing policy was reasonable and
constitutional and reversed the holding of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals. 30 Still, it cautioned that such suspicionless
drug testing policies would not always pass constitutional
scrutiny. Instead, it noted that "It]he most significant element in
this case is the first we discussed: that the Policy was undertaken
in furtherance of the government's respbnsibilities, under a
public school system, as guardian and tutor of children entrusted
to its care. '131 Many cases that will be presented in this article
point to this as the most important factor leading to the Supreme
Acton, 515 U.S. at 662-63 (quoting Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1357).
Acton, 515 U.S. at 663.
128 Id.
129 Id.
10 Id. at 664-65.
131Acton, 515 U.S. at 665.
126
127
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Court's Acton decision.

B. Refinement of the Judicial Model
In Acton, the Supreme Court went to great lengths to
delineate the particular test courts should use when reviewing a
drug testing policy in a public school. Initially, the Court noted
that as a search, the constitutionality of any drug testing policy
must be measured by its reasonableness. This reasonableness is
then judged by balancing the privacy interests of the individuals
tested against the governmental interests promoting the policy.
Throughout the opinion, the Acton court focused on weighing the
different aspects of this reasonableness test.
The Court does not so clearly correlate its analysis of the
policy as part of its special needs doctrine discussed earlier.
Instead, the Supreme Court merely reiterated that it found such
special needs to exist in the public school context.132 As a result,
given this initial finding that special needs exist, the focus of the
case is on the reasonableness test itself.
Two years after Acton, the Supreme Court provided further
guidance as to what these special needs are. The case of
Chandler v. Miller 133 dealt with a random urinalysis drug testing
policy for candidates to public office in Georgia. 3 4 In discussing
whether there was a special need to test candidates, the Court
provided further guidance as to exactly how to assess such special
needs.
According to the Court, "[w]hen such 'special needs'. . .are
alleged in justification of a Fourth Amendment intrusion, courts
must undertake a context-specific inquiry, examining closely the
competing private and public interests advanced by the
132 Id. at 653 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 340-41 (1985)).

520 U.S. 305 (1997). For further discussion of this case, see,
for
example, Joy L. Ames, Note, Chandler v. Miller: Redefining "Special Needs" for
Suspicionless Drug Testing Under the Fourth Amendment, 31 AKRON L. REV. 273
(1997); Nathan A. Brown, Recent Development, Reining In The National Drug
Testing Epidemic: Chandler V. Miller, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 253 (1998);
Michael E. Brewer, Chandler v. Miller: No Turning Back from a Fourth
Amendment ReasonablenessAnalysis, 75 DENV. U.L. REV. 275 (1997).
133

134

Id. at 308.
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parties." 135 These special needs must be "substantial," that is,
"important enough to override the individual's acknowledged
privacy interest, [and] sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth
Amendment's normal requirement of individualized suspicion."136
The Court also noted that
A demonstrated problem of drug abuse, while not in
all cases necessary to the validity of a testing
regime... would shore up an assertion of special
need for a suspicionless general search program.
Proof of unlawful drug use may help to clarify-and
to substantiate-the precise hazards posed by such
use.

137

Striking down the policy, the Court held that the State of
Georgia had not provided any evidence of a drug problem among
elected officials and that these officials did not perform any safety
sensitive tasks warranting drug testing.138 The Court held that
the need professed by the State was "in short, symbolic, not
'special.' " 139 The Court also stated that "where the risk to public
safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches
calibrated to the risk may rank as 'reasonable,'" but, "where, as in
this case, public safety is not genuinely in jeopardy, the Fourth
Amendment precludes the suspicionless search, no matter how
conveniently arranged." 40
This clarification of special needs adds to the reasonableness
balancing test presented in Acton. As another court explained,
"[p]rior to conducting the balancing, in surveying the public
interests at issue ...we must specifically inquire into whether
the drug-testing program at issue is warranted by a 'special
need.""'4 Moreover,
Chandler,520 U.S. at 314.
Id. at 318.
137 Id. at 319.
138 Id. at 321-22.
139 Id. at 322 (stating that a "symbolic" need is one that is
"insufficient to
establish a special need justifying drug testing"). See also Baron v. City of
Hollywood, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1341 (S.D. FL 2000).
15
136

140 Chandler,520 U.S. at 323.
141

19 Solid Waste Dep't Mech.'s v. City of Albuquerque, 156 F.3d 1068,
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Only if we can say that the government has made
that special need showing do we then inquire into
the relative strengths of the competing private and
public interests to settle whether the testing
requirement is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. If the government has not made its
special need showing, then the inquiry is complete,
and the testing program must be struck down as
unconstitutional. Thus, the first, and ultimately
decisive, question.., is whether the.. .drug testing
142
program is warranted by a special need.
Therefore, the inquiry is a two-step process: "[f]irst, a court
must determine whether special needs exist that justify a
suspicionless search. If, and only if, such special needs are
present, may a court then proceed to the second phase, balancing
public versus private interests."

C The Judicial Model
In an earlier article, this author presented a judicial model for
reviewing a drug testing policy in athletics, which included the
assessment of special needs as part of the analysis of the
governmental interest in promotion of the policy.144 The analysis
in this article leads to a different judicial model. Following from
the cases already discussed (primarily T.L.O., Acton, Skinner,
Von Raab, and Chandler), the judicial model for reviewing a drug
testing policy at the interscholastic level can be represented as
follows.
Step One: Special Needs Analysis
Following Chandler, a court must first undertake a
context-specific inquiry examining the interests of

1072 (10th Cir. 1998).
142
143
144

Id.
O'Neill v. Louisiana, 61 F. Supp. 2d 485 (E.D. La. 1998).
Anderson, supra note 7, at 216.
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the parties involved to make sure that they are
supported by a special need. This special need must
be substantial and not merely symbolic, meaning
that it is important enough to override the
individual's privacy interest, and sufficiently vital to
suppress
the
requirement
of individualized
suspicion.
If a special need is present then the analysis shifts
to the balancing test
Step Two: Reasonableness Balancing Test
Following T.L.O. and refined in Acton, the court
must balance the invasion of the individual or
group's privacy interests at stake against the
governmental interest promoted by the policy.
The first part of this balancing is an assessment
of the nature of the privacy interest at stake.
This interest must be legitimate, and may
depend on the individual's relationship with
the State.
This will also include a review of the
character of the intrusion on the particular
privacy interest caused by the government's
conduct. In analyzing the character of the
intrusion, a court should look to the degree of
the intrusion and the type of information that
the search discloses.
The second part of the balancing is a look at the
governmental interest promoted by the policy.
This interest is assessed by looking at its
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nature, which may be compelling but must be
important enough to justify the particular
search.
The court should also analyze whether the
governmental interest is of an immediate
nature so that it is a concern that must be
dealt with.
And the court must analyze whether the
intrusion itself is an efficacious way to meet
the
concerns
demonstrated
by
the
governmental interest.
If there is a special need (Step One), and the
government's interest in promotion of the testing
outweighs its invasion of the individual's privacy
rights (Step Two), then the test should be found to
be reasonable, and therefore, constitutional.
To this point, this is the test that courts should follow in
reviewing drug testing policies. The analysis will now shift to
cases following Acton, which have dealt with drug testing policies
at the interscholastic level that test more than just student
athletes.
IV. Extracurricular Cases
After the Chandler decision, courts began to review many
cases involving drug testing policies testing student participants
in non-athletic extracurricular activities. These cases deal with
programs that test students who are involved in extracurricular
activities while in public school, often activities like debate team,
Fellowship of Christian Students, or other activities which cannot
properly be qualified as athletics of any nature. These activities
do not involve the same health and safety concerns that are often
found in athletics.
The cases will be presented in three separate chronological
categories separated by decisions in the Earls case.
This
separation will assist in understanding the progression of
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reasoning that courts have undertaken in dealing with the issue.
A. 1998 until Earls 1
The first cases discussed were decided after the Chandler
decision and before the first decision in the Earls litigation.
Overall, the courts in these cases look favorably on the drug
testing policies promulgated by the various school districts
involved.
1 45
1. Todd v. Rush County Schools

In this case, the Rush County School Board instituted a drug
testing program requiring students wishing to participate in
extracurricular activities to consent to random suspicionless
urine testing for nicotine, alcohol and unlawful drug use.146
Extracurricular activities included Student Council, Foreign
Language Clubs, the Fellowship of Christian Athletes, Future
Farmers of America, and the Library Club. 47 Any student failing
the drug test was given the opportunity to retest or explain the
result by showing that they were lawfully taking medication, or
that they had some other lawful excuse. 14 8 After failing two tests
or without satisfactory explanation, the student would be barred
Several
from participating in extracurricular activities. 49
was an
students and their parents sued claiming that the policy
150
Amendment.
Fourth
unconstitutional violation of the
In its review, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals explicitly
followed its own decision in Schaill and the Acton decision, while
noting that the Supreme Court determined "deterring drug use
by students was a compelling interest, finding that 'school years
are the time when the physiological, psychological, and addictive
effects of drugs are most severe.'" 151 Although not specifically
145

133 F.3d 984 (7th Cir. 1998).

146 Id. at 984.
147

Id.

148

Id. at 985.

149

Id.

150 Todd, 133 F.3d at 985.
151 Id. at 986 (quotingActon, 515 U.S. at 661).
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discussing the parts of the test used in Acton, the Seventh Circuit
found that "the reasoning compelling drug testing of athletes also
applies to testing of students involved in extracurricular
activities" 152 because any such extracurricular activities also
require healthy students.
The court noted that although pariticipation in such
extracurricular activities may be beneficial to the educational
experience, such participation is still a privilege while in high
school. 153 The court also looked to its earlier decision in Schaill
and its finding that the student athletes tested were only tested
"'as a condition of participation in an extracurricular activity,' in
that case athletics."54 Similar to the Acton case, "students in
other extracurricular activities, like athletes, 'can take leadership
roles in the school community and serve as an example to
others,"' and therefore, "it is appropriate to include students who
participate in extracurricular activities in the drug testing." 5
In the end, according to the Seventh Circuit, and echoing
Acton, "[tihe linchpin of this drug testing program is to protect
the health of the students involved.56 Therefore, as the drug
testing program in Todd was "sufficiently similar" to the one in
Acton, the Seventh Circuit found that it withstood constitutional
scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment.'57
2. Willis v. Anderson Cmty Sch. Corp.15
In December of 1997, Willis was suspended for fighting with a
fellow student. Upon his return to school, he was informed that
he would be tested for drug and alcohol use according to the drug
testing policy of the Anderson Community School Corporation.
When he refused to consent to the policy, he was suspended
again, told that a further refusal would be deemed to be an
admission of unlawful drug use, and that he would be suspended
152

Id.

153

Id.

154 Id. (quoting

Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1319).
"' Todd, 133 F.3d at 986.
156 Id.
157

Id.

158 158 F.3d 415 (7th Cir. 1998).
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a third time pending expulsion proceedings. Willis sued claiming

that this policy violated his constitutional rights. Even though
this case does not deal with a policy testing student participants
in extracurricular activities, it is still important because the court
again analyzes a drug testing policy under the standards
provided in Acton.
The Seventh Circuit focused on whether the Corporation had
special needs warranting the drug testing policy. Although the
court recognized that the Corporation alleged special concerns
such as deterring drug use, disciplining students, and protecting
the health of students, it went further and focused on the
practicality of the testing policy.', 9 It noted, "the feasibility of a
suspicion-based search is a key consideration in determining
whether it is reasonable for the government to implement a
suspicionless regime." 6 ° Still, the court would not circumvent the
entire special needs analysis simply to focus on the potential
practicality of the search itself.
The court undertook a more detailed analysis of the Acton
factors than in Todd. It first found that although the student's
privacy interest was similar to that in Acton, there was no aspect
of communal undress or voluntariness. 6 ' Next, the court found
that the nature and immediacy of the policy was similar to Acton
because the policy was specifically tailored to students that the
Corporation determined were at risk. Moreover, even though
there was not as immediate a problem as in Acton, such
immediacy was not meaningfully less. 62 Finally, the court
focused on the efficacy of the policy and noted, "it is hard to
believe that Deans of Students would have any difficulty
justifying a finding of reasonable suspicion in fighting cases.
Therefore the imposition of a suspicionless policy seems to serve
primarily demonstrative or symbolic purposes." 63
Therefore, because the means used to address the drug testing
problem were not efficacious, the government's interest did not
...Id. at 420.
160 Id.
161
162

Id. at 422.
Id. at 423.

163 Willis,

158 F.3d at 423-24.
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outweigh the student's privacy interest involved, and the policy
was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.164
'
3. TrinidadSchool DistrictNo. 1 v. Lopez 65

In this case, the Trinidad School District No. 1 Board of
Education instituted a drug testing policy testing all sixth
through twelfth grade students participating in extracurricular
activities. 66' Carlos Lopez was a senior high school student who
enrolled in two for-credit band classes and participated in the
marching band.1 67 Lopez refused to consent to the drug testing
policy and was subsequently suspended from the band classes
68
and marching band.
In response, Lopez and his parents sued the District claiming
that the policy violated his rights under the Fourth
Amendment. 6 9 The trial court upheld the policy, and Lopez
appealed the decision.7 0 Both parties then sought an expedited
review from the Supreme Court of Colorado. 7 '
The Colorado Supreme Court began its review noting that the
Supreme Court's Acton decision "established the framework for
analyzing the constitutionality of a public school district's drug
testing program similar to the one we consider here." 72 As a
result, the drug testing policy at issue here also fell within the
Supreme Court's special needs jurisprudence. 73 Therefore, the
court turned to the test the Supreme Court used in Acton.
The court first looked at the nature of the student's privacy
interest at issue.
In assessing this interest, the Colorado
Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court and distinguished
the case from Acton. First, the court found it important that the
164 Id. at 424.
165

963 P.2d 1095 (Colo. 1998).

166

Id. at 1096-99.
Id. at 1097.

167

169

Id.
Id.

170

Lopez, 963 P.2d at 1097.

171

Id.

172

Id. at 1105.
Id. at 1106.

168

173
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Acton court focused on the "communal undress" nature of
athletics.
Contrary to this, "the record indicates a qualitatively
different type of undressing from the communal undressing the
Supreme Court described. .. ,1 Furthermore, the policy at issue
did not simply apply to voluntary activities, it also applied to forcredit activities. In sum, "[w]hile we recognize that students in
the public school system have lesser expectations of privacy than
adults in the general population, we view the absence of
voluntariness and the qualitatively different type of undressing
in this case as significant."1 76 As a result, the students tested in
this case had higher expectations of privacy than those in Acton.
Next, the court reviewed the character of the intrusion caused
by the drug testing program. The court questioned the trial
court's comparison of the drug testing program to what students
go through daily in a public restroom. As the court explained,
ordinarily a student has some choice about when to use a
restroom, does not have an official monitor, and does not have to
urinate into a container.'77 Regardless of this disagreement, the
court followed Acton and found that this intrusion was still
negligible. 71 8
Finally, the court looked to the nature of the governmental
interest promoted by the policy and the efficacy of drug testing as
a means to meet this interest. While the court agreed with the
trial court's determination that the district had a serious drug
problem, it disagreed with the trial court's analysis of the efficacy
of the policy in dealing with this problem. The court found it of
particular importance that, unlike Acton, "the Policy included all
students participating in all extracurricular activities, as well as
students who want to enroll in a for-credit class," even though
there was no evidence that these students suffered from the same
immediate risk of harm due to drug use as athletes. 79 In fact,
evidence showed that the students affected by this policy "had
174
175
176

177
178

179

Id. at 1106-07.
Lopez, 963 P.2d at 1107.
Id.
Id. at 1108.
Id.
Id. at 1109.
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better discipline records and performed better academically than
did students in the general population." 180 The court concluded
that "[in our view, simply being a role model by virtue of
participation in an extracurricular activity is insufficient to
support a conclusion that the school's mandated drug testing
181
program was reasonable.1
The court also found the sheer amount of students that were
subject to testing troublesome. Although the district argued that
participation in extracurricular activities is voluntary and a
privilege, the court determined that "the reality for many
students who wish to pursue post-secondary educational training
and/or professional vocations requiring experience garnered only
by participating in extracurricular activities is that they must
engage in such activities. 182
In the end, because it was able to distinguish the character of
the intrusion from that in Acton, and because it determined that
the drug testing was not an efficacious means to combat the drug
testing program, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed the trial
court's decision.
4. Miller v. Wilkes ' 83
In the 1997-1998 school year, the School District Board of
Education of Cave City, Arkansas, instituted a drug screening
policy for students in grades seven through twelve.18 4 Students
who refused to consent to the testing were barred from
participating in extracurricular activities. 85 Pathe Miller wanted
to participate in the Radio Club, prom committees, the quiz bowl,
and school dances, but refused to be tested and was barred from
participating in any of these activities. 86 He and his parents then
sued the school district, claiming that the policy violated his
180 Lopez, 963 P.2d at 1109.
181 Id.

Id.
172 F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 1999), vacated as moot, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
13289 (8th Cir. 1999).
184 Id. at 576.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 577.
182

183
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Fourth
The trial court granted summary judgment to the school
district finding that the policy did not violate Miller's
constitutional rights.188 The Millers then appealed to the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals.189
At the outset, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit discussed the Acton case and began to go through
the Supreme Court's balancing test.190 Assessing the scope of the
student's legitimate expectations of privacy, the court determined
that "student status was fundamental to [the Supreme Court's]
conclusions concerning the diminished expectation of privacy"
that it found student athletes to have.' 9' Miller argued that the
fact that the policy applied only to student athletes was more
important. The court disagreed stating that
The Court did say that 'legitimate privacy
expectations are even less with regard to student
athletes'... That is not to say, however, that it is
only the student who seeks to engage in
extracurricular school sports activities whose
legitimate expectation of privacy is so diminished
that a search such as this one can stand up to
constitutional scrutiny.

92

The Eighth Circuit also noted that extracurricular activities
will have their own rules and regulations to be followed and
someone to monitor compliance with these rules, therefore,
"students who elect to be involved in school activities have a
legitimate expectation of privacy that is diminished to a level
below that of the already lowered expectation of non-participating
students."''
Moving on to a review of the character of the intrusion itself,
the court found that the procedure for collecting the urine sample
187

Id.

188

Miller, F.3d at 577.

189
190
191
192
193

Id. at 576.
Id. at 577-78.
Id. at 578.
Miller, 172 F.3d at 579.
Id.
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was no more intrusive than that in Acton and so its intrusion on

the lowered privacy interest of students was negligible.194 The
court also found that the information that was received from the
testing was also protected in the same way as in Acton and so its
intrusion was also not significant. 19
The court finally turned to a review of the school district's
interest in promoting the policy. Although finding that the
nature of the district's policy in combating the drug use problem
among students was the same as that in Acton, the court
acknowledged that there was no immediacy to the drug problem
in this case. 96 However, it did not believe that this difference was
decisive. Instead, it stated that "[wle see no reason that a school
district should be compelled to wait until there is a demonstrable
problem with substance abuse among its own students before the
district is constitutionally permitted to take measures that will
help protect its schools against the sort of 'rebellion"' 197 that
existed in the Acton case. The court recognized the Chandler
court's realization that demonstrating a severe drug problem
would "shore up" an assertion of a special need leading to a drug
testing program, but it determined that given the compelling
state interest in deterring drug use, and the serious problems it
can entail once such use is a problem, "the 'nature and
immediacy' of the governmental concern provides strong support
for the random testing policy at issue in this case."'198
Balancing these factors by "[w]eighing the minimal intrusion
on the lowered expectation of privacy against the district's
concern and the essentially unchallenged efficacy of its policy,"
the court concluded that the policy was reasonable and
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment. 99

194
195
196

197
198

199

Id. at 579-80.
Id. at 580.
Id.
Miller, 172 F.3d at 581.
Id.
Id.
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5. Earls v. Board of Education of Tecumseh Public
School District 2°°
The final case to be discussed in this section is the first
decision in the Earls litigation. The Board of Education of
Tecumseh Public School District and Tecumseh Public Schools
instituted a drug testing policy requiring all students who
participated in extracurricular activities to submit to
suspicionless drug testing in 1998.201 Although the policy was
initially only applied to extracurricular activities of a competitive
nature, because the majority of students in the district
participated in one or more extracurricular activities, the policy
impacted a majority of the students. Lindsey Earls, a member of
the show choir, marching band and academic team, and Daniel
James, a student seeking to be a member of the academic team,
sued challenging the policy as a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.2 °2
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma reviewed the case explicitly following the Acton
decision. This case presents a much more in-depth use of the test
developed by the Supreme Court than the cases just discussed.
The court began, mirroring Step One of the judicial model put
forth above, with a discussion of special needs. Pointing to Acton
and T.L.O., the court noted that the United States Supreme
Court has found that special needs exist in the public school
context, meaning that the normal requirements of a warrant
based on probable cause are not necessary. 203 The plaintiffs
argued that the district did not show similar special needs
because there was no epidemic drug problem as in Acton. While
the court agreed that the evidence in the present case did not
demonstrate a problem of that proportion, consistent with the
Supreme Court's analysis the court also had to look to factors
such as
the cultural or social atmosphere in which students
200
201
202
203

115 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (W.D. Okla. 2000) (hereinafter Earls 1).
Id. at 1282.
Id.
Id. at 1283-84.
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spoke openly of illegal drug use, even in the presence
of teachers; phone calls to school board members
from parents; and the public plea of a concerned
mother who implored the school board to "do
something" about the problem of drug use among the
high school's students. °4
Looking at all of this evidence, the court found it beyond
dispute that there was a drug problem in the school district. 20 5
Furthermore, similar to the Miller court, the Western District
court found it "rather anomalous to require school officials to
await an epidemic before taking peremptory measures."2 °6
Therefore, the first step of the test was met as the district had
demonstrated a special need sufficient to justify the drug testing
policy.
The court then moved to Step Two of the judicial model, the
balancing test. Again mirroring the Miller case, the court did not
agree, "it is only athletes whose legitimate expectation of privacy
is so diminished that a search such as this one can withstand
constitutional scrutiny."2 7 Instead, "there are features of nonathletic, extracurricular school activities that will lower the
privacy expectation of those who opt to participate to a point
Therefore, students who
below that of fellow students." 20 8
participate in extracurricular activities have an expectation of
privacy that is diminished as compared to those who do not
participate.
As to the character of the intrusion caused by the drug
testing, the court found that the procedure and method by which
test results were disseminated was similar to Acton and so in
accord with the Supreme Court's decision, "the invasion of
20 9
privacy was not significant."
The court finally turned to the governmental interest involved
although it only focused on the effectiveness of the policy in
204

205

Id. at 1286.
Earls 1, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 1287.

206

Id. at 1288.

207

Id. at 1289.

208

Id.

209

Id. at 1295
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addressing the district's concern. Although the parties debated
whether the Tecumseh policy was as effective as that in Acton,
the court made clear that the Supreme Court "does not require a
school district to isolate those students most likely to use
drugs." 210 According to this court, there was no doubt that "the

drug problem among the student body is effectively addressed by
making sure that the large number of students participating in
211
competitive, extracurricular activities do not use drugs."

Weighing these factors, the court determined that the district
had justified its policy, and so the policy constituted a reasonable
and constitutional search. 212

6. Analysis
These first cases all attempted to follow the Acton decision
and the judicial model, although the depth at which this was
accomplished was not consistent. The Todd court focused on the
health risks associated with drug testing and the leadership
potential for students in extracurricular activities in finding that
the district's policy served its goal of combating student drug use.
The Miller court focused almost entirely on the fact that public
school students, regardless of what activities they are involved in,
have diminished expectations of privacy, and also would not force
the school district to wait until there was an epidemic level
problem before instituting a drug testing problem. The Earls 1
court followed the Miller decision and provided a much more
detailed analysis of the Acton case and the steps this article has
presented as the judicial model. Interestingly, this court did not
focus on the immediacy or compelling nature of the district's
concern; instead, it focused on the efficacy of the policy and would
not contradict the district's concerns.
The anomalous case is the Colorado Supreme Court's decision
in Lopez. Instead of setting levels of diminished expectations of
privacy based on whether students participated in activities or
not, the Colorado Supreme Court found it important that the
210 Earls 1, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 1295.
211
212

Id.
Id. at 1296.

HeinOnline -- 4 Tex. Rev. Ent. & Sports L. 38 2003

20031

DRUG TESTING AT THE INTERSCHOLASTIC LEVEL

students involved had higher expectations of privacy than those
in Acton. The court also found it of utmost importance that the
drug testing policy tested students in extracurricular activities
although there was no evidence that these students were part of
the drug problem. Furthermore, the court was troubled by the
sheer amount of students who could be tested (something that did
not trouble the Earls 1 court), and although it did not specifically
state that extracurricular activities are more than a privilege at
the interscholastic level, it found it very important that students
be allowed to participate in these activities to meet their future
goals.
At this point in the analysis, although there was as yet no
Circuit split, the Lopez decision left some doubt as to the validity
of drug testing policies affecting students in all extracurricular
activities. The cases that follow only add to the confusion.
B. 2000 until Earls 2.
After the Earls 1 decision, litigation over similar drug testing
policies picked up. It was also at this time, until the next
decision in the Earls litigation, when the judicial view toward
these drug testing policies became decidedly unfavorable.
23
1. Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison School Corporation

Penn-Harris-Madison School Corporation instituted a random,
suspicionless drug testing policy which tested all students
involved in extracurricular activities, who drove to school, who
volunteered to be tested, who were suspended from school, or who
were reasonably suspected of drug use.1 4 Students who refused
to be tested were dealt with as if they had tested positive." 5
Students testing positive were subject to different levels of
suspension from school." 6
The testing procedure itself was slightly different from those
discussed so far. Initially, students had to provide information
213
214
215
216

212 F.3d 1052 (7th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1055.
Id. at 1056.
Id. at 1056 n.4.
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about any medication that they were already taking and remove
all outer garments leaving all of their belongings outside of the
testing facility.217 The student produced the sample in a stall
with the monitor outside. 18 The monitor then checked the sample
for temperature and tampering.1 9
Several students involved in extracurricular activities and
who drove to school sued Penn High School claiming that the
policy violated their Fourth Amendment rights. 220 The district
court followed the Todd case and upheld the policy as it applied
to the extracurricular students. 221 The district court also upheld
the policy for students who drove to school finding that students
consent to testing in exchange for the privilege of driving to
school.222 The students then appealed to the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals.
The Seventh Circuit began with a discussion of the Acton
balancing test. The court acknowledged that in its decision in
Todd it had not followed this methodology closely, but it also
discussed the Willis case, which had followed Acton more
closely. 22 The court admitted that upon further review "if we
were reviewing this case based solely on Vernonia and Chandler,
we would not sustain the random drug, alcohol, and nicotine
testing of students seeking to participate in extracurricular
activities."22 4 This initial statement, although not a conclusion in
the case, hints at the court's changed viewpoint in regard to drug
testing programs testing students at the interscholastic level.
Working through the Acton balancing test the court first found
that "the expectation of privacy for students in extracurricular
activities or with parking permits, although less than the general
public, is still greater than the expectation of privacy for
217

Id. at 1057.

218 Joy, 212 F.3d at 1057.
219

Id.

220

Id. at 1057.

Id.
Id.
223Joy, 212 F.3d at 1062-63.
221

222

224 Id. at 1063. Several courts refer to the Supreme
Court's decision in the

Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton case as "Vernonia." For purposes of this
article, the author refers to the case as Acton.
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athletes.225
As to the character of the intrusion the court found that the
policy itself was similar to that in Acton and "we conclude that
the character of the intrusion is not overly invasive."2 6
The court then turned to an analysis of the governmental
interest involved and unlike any of the other cases discussed, it
stated that such interest should be analyzed from two
perspectives: "whether there is any correlation between the
defined population and the abuse, and whether there is any
correlation between the abuse and the government's interest in
protecting

life

and

'
property."227

Looking

at

these

two

perspectives, the court first found that the school had not shown
any correlation between drug use and those students who engage
in extracurricular activities or drive to school.228 With regard to
the second perspective, although the court found that the school
corporation might have been justified because there was a
definite risk of injury associated with student drivers, it had not
"explained how drug use affects students in extracurricular
activities differently than students in general.

229

The court then turned to the immediacy of the governmental
interest involved, finding that the school corporation "simply has
not established that any immediate problem with drugs or
alcohol exists for its students in extracurricular activities.

230

Finally, as to the efficacy of the testing to combat the perceived
drug problem, the court found that "there is no showing that the
students subject to testing are the ones that must be tested to
resolve the perceived problems."23'
In the end, the court determined that the school corporation
had shown that testing student drivers was reasonable, but there
was no sufficient governmental interest supporting testing of

225

Id.

Id. at 1063-64.
227 Id. at 1064.
228 Joy, 212 F.3d at
1064.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 1065.
226

231

Id.

HeinOnline -- 4 Tex. Rev. Ent. & Sports L. 41 2003

42

TEXAS REVIEW OF
ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW

[Vol. 4:1

students in extracurricular activities. 232 Still, following principles

of stare decisis and precedent, the court decided that it had to
follow Todd and uphold the policy.2 33 The court cautioned though

that its decisions in Todd and Joy did not equate to an allowance
of drug testing programs for all students in public school,
something the district admittedly was looking for. Instead, "the
case has yet to be made that a urine sample can be the 'tuition' at
a public school."2 4
2. Linke v. Northwestern School Corp.235
The Northwestern School Corporation (NSC) implemented a
drug testing policy that applied to all students in grades seven
through twelve who wanted to participate in athletics, extracurricular activities and certain co-curricular activities similar to
those covered by the policies already discussed.236 Rosa Linke
participated in the National Honor Society, Students Against
Drunk Driving, the Prom Committee and the Academic
Competition and did not want to be tested. 7 The Linkes sued,
23 8
claiming that the policy violated her privacy rights.

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Indiana began
its review of the case by pointing to the Todd, Willis, and Joy
cases as representative of how drug policies in Indiana must be

232
233

Id.
Joy, 212 F.3d at 1066. The court made clear that
we are bound by this court's recent precedent in Todd. Given
that the opinion in Todd was issued only two years ago, that
the facts of our case do not differ substantially from the facts
in Todd, that the court in Willis reaffirmed the basic
principles in Todd, and that the governing Supreme Court
precedent has yet to address the matter, we believe that we
must adhere to the holding in Todd and affirm the district
court's grant of summary judgment for the School as it relates
to testing students involved in extracurricular activities. Id.

234 Id. at 1067.
235 734 N.E.2d 252
236
237
238

(Ind. Ct. App. 2000).

Id. at 253-54.
Id. at 253, 254.
Id. at 254.
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reviewed.239
However, this case called for more than a
determination of whether the policy withstood scrutiny under the
United States Constitution, it also asked the court to review how
the policy fit under the Indiana Constitution. As the court
explained, "there is support for the proposition that [the Indiana
Constitution] provides greater protection than the Fourth
Amendment," and cases under Indiana law "should be analyzed
under an independent reasonableness standard."24 °
According to the court, under Indiana jurisprudence, the focus
is on the reasonableness of the official behavior considered;
however, the Indiana Constitution implicitly provides "a general
requirement of individualized suspicion at least with regard to
school children." 241 In addition, because NSC did not provide any
direct correlation between the students tested and a drug
problem (NSC admitted that the policy was about prevention and
not about combating an existing problem), it was "an
unmistakable move toward randomly testing all students."242
In the end, the court was dismayed by the contrary decisions
in the cases discussed so far, stating that Acton's "suggested caseby-case approach to determine which groups of students may be
randomly tested under the Fourth Amendment has failed, "243
specifically with respect to the jurisprudence in the Seventh
Circuit from Todd to Joy. The court struck down the policy as
unreasonable under the Indiana Constitution.244
3. Milligan v. The City of SlidelP

45

The Milligan case did not deal with a drug testing policy.
Instead, it dealt with a search of students called out of class
based on rumors of a potential fight. Still, the case is useful
because it presents the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit's analysis of the special needs doctrine and
239

Id. at 257-58.

24'

Linke, 734 N.E.2d at 259.

241
242
243
244

Id.
Id. at 259-60.
Id.
id.

245 226 F.3d 652 (5th Cir. 2000).
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reasonable test.
Demonstrating the Fifth Circuit's approval of the judicial
model discussed above, the court went through each aspect of the
model and found that the search of the students was reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.246 The court also reiterated that
"the Supreme Court has refused to impose any least restrictive
means test upon searches under the Fourth Amendment.

' 42 7

And

therefore, "[c]onsidering the weakness of the claimed privacy
right and the significance of the governmental concern, the
officers' actions were reasonable and therefore constitutional."248
2 49
4. Theodore v. Delaware Valley School District

This case again involved a drug testing policy testing student
participants in extracurricular activities and those who wished to
obtain driving and parking privileges. Similar to the Linke case,
the focus of this case was on the state constitution and not the
general protections of the Fourth Amendment.
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania noted early on in
its opinion that the Pennsylvania Constitution "provides greater
protection" than the Fourth Amendment, "since the core of its
exclusionary rule is grounded in the protection of privacy while
the federal exclusionary rule is grounded in deterring police
misconduct." 250

However, similar to the second prong of the

reasonableness balancing test, "a search by the state must not
only be based on a compelling interest, but... whether the state's
'
intrusion will effect its purpose. '2,1
The court concluded that the students' privacy expectations

22
were still reduced even under the Pennsylvania Constitution.

Moreover, in this case, the testing was done to protect the health
246
247
248
249

2001).
250

251

Id.
Id. at 655.
Id. at 656.
761 A.2d 652 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000), appeal granted, 782 A.2d 551 (Pa.
Id. at 656.
Id. (quoting Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hospital Center, 609 A.2d 796,

802 (1992)).
252 Theodore, 761 A.2d at 658.
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of the students involved and if they did not consent to the testing
they would only have to give up "participation in extracurricular
activities or driving/parking privileges,"253 so their privacy
interests were even lower.
Turning to Acton, the court found that the testing of student
athletes would also have been reasonable under the Pennsylvania
Constitution because there was a compelling government interest
justifying the search.25 ' However, after also looking to Todd and
Miller, the court determined that under the Pennsylvania
Constitution, "a student's privacy interests are no less than any
other student's just by participating in any extracurricular
activity or by seeking driving/parking privileges." 255 The court
also examined the intrusion caused by the testing method and
found that it was not significant. 256
The court's main problem with the policy was that "no reason
is given for a special need to test only those students who engage
in optional activities or request driving/parking privileges more
than the general student population."257 Therefore, because the
Pennsylvania Constitution provided the students with a higher
expectation of privacy and because there was no special need or
compelling interest put forth by the school district, the court
found the policy to be unreasonable under the Pennsylvania
Constitution. 58
5. Gardner v. Tulia Independent School District 259
The Gardner case involved a similar policy testing students in
grades seven through twelve who were involved in
extracurricular activities.
Students sued the school district
claiming that the policy violated the Fourth Amendment.
The District Court for the Northern District of Texas began by
253
254
255
256

Id. at 658.
Id. at 659.
Id.
Id. at 661.

257 Theodore, 761 A.2d at 661.

Id.
183 F. Supp. 2d 854 (N.D. Tex. 2000), judgment entered by, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20252, vacated by, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19582 (5th Cir. 2002).
258

259
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referring to Brooks, which struck down a similar policy as
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.260 In the present
case, there was no widespread drug problem among the students
tested; in fact, no students that participated in extracurricular
activities had ever been subject to drug related discipline. 61 In
addition, while acknowledging that some courts interpreted the
Acton ruling as support for testing of students in all
extracurricular activities, as in Todd, this court concluded that
"the holding in Vernonia was limited to random drug testing of
the student athletes. 262 The Supreme Court had made no
pronouncement of the constitutionality of more generalized
policies to this point.
As a result, because there was no connection between the
testing program and any special or other need to test students in
extracurricular activities,63 the court found that the policy violated
2
the Fourth Amendment.
6. Tannahill v. Lockney Independent School District6
Soon after the Gardner decision, the same Texas court
reviewed the claim of a sixth grade student who sued the Lockney
Independent School District claiming that its drug testing policy,
which applied to the entire student population from grades six
through twelve, was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. The
court again turned to its earlier finding in Brooks as it reasoned
that there were no special needs presented as justification for this
26
testing policy.
However, after reviewing the cases from the Firth Circuit and
Supreme Court, this court found that two methods of establishing
special needs have evolved:
On the one hand, special needs can be shown in
instances ... when the individual subject to the test
16'

Brooks, 930 F.2d 915.

261 Gardner,183 F. Supp. 2d at 856-57.

Id. at 858.
263 Id at 859.
264 133 F. Supp. 2d 919 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
265 Id. at 924.
262
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performs highly regulated functions concerning the
public safety or special governmental roles. On the
other hand, a school district can prove the existence
of a special need by showing exigent circumstances
and continued failure in attempts to alleviate the
problem. 66
Furthermore, "general concerns about maintaining drug-free
schools or desires to detect illegal conduct are insufficient as a
matter of law to demonstrate the existence of special needs."267
The court then analyzed the privacy interests of the students
tested, finding that "[t]heir expectations of privacy are higher"
than that of the students in Acton.268 Next, the court determined,
in line with most of the cases discussed, that the method of
testing was a minimal intrusion on these privacy rights. 269 And
finally, as to the district's interest in support of the policy, the
court determined that "the facts of the case at bar militate
270
against a finding that the District's interest is compelling.
In the end, given the student's higher expectations of privacy
than student athletes, and the dearth of evidence of any special
need in support of the testing, the court concluded that the policy
271
was an unreasonable violation of the Fourth Amendment.
7. Earls v. Board of Education of Tecumseh Public
272
School District
The final case to be discussed in this section is the second
decision in the Earls litigation, the review of the United States
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma's decision by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The
facts of the case were already discussed; what is important here
is to focus on the Tenth Circuit's analysis of the judicial model.

266

Id. at 928.

267

Id.

268

Id. at 929.

269 Tannahill, 133

F. Supp. 2d at 929.
Id.
271 Id. at 930.
272 242 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2001) (hereinafter Earls
2).
270
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The court begins by pointing to the 19 Solid Waste Dept.
Mechanics case where it laid out the special needs and
reasonableness analysis. According to the court
Chandler requires courts to inquire first into
whether the government has established the
existence of a special need before proceeding to any
balancing of government and private interests. We
defined that inquiry as two-fold: first, "whether the
proffered governmental concerns were 'real' by
asking whether the testing program was adopted in
response to a documented drug abuse problem or
whether drug abuse among the target group would
pose a serious danger to the public"; and second,
"whether the testing scheme met the related goals of
detection and deterrence."273
Following this analysis, the court first found that "while there
was clearly some drug use at the Tecumseh schools, such use
among students subject to the testing Policy was negligible. 274
Subsequently, the court spent a significant amount of time
analyzing the first part of Step Two of the judicial model-the
student's privacy interest in the present case.
The Tenth Circuit would not focus on the communal undress
language that so many other courts had found important from
the Acton case as it explained "[wie doubt that the Court intends
that the level of privacy expectation depends upon the degree to
which particular students, or groups of students, dress or shower
together or, on occasion, share sleeping or bathroom facilities
while on occasional out-of-town trips.27 Moreover, while it was
important that students in extracurricular activities voluntarily
submit themselves to additional forms of regulation above that of
other students, referring to the Theodore case, the court did not
believe that this alone should cause a reduction in their
expectation of privacy.2 76 The court also pointed to the Supreme
Court's admonition against " 'minimizing the importance to many
273 Id. at 1269 (quoting 19 Solid Waste Dep't Mech.'s, 156 F.3d at
1072).
274

Id. at 1275.

275

Id.

276Id. at 1276.
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students of attending and participating in extracurricular
activities as part of a complete educational experience.' 27 7 Still,
due to the regulations apparent in any extracurricular activity,
the court agreed with the district court that even these students
have a "somewhat lesser privacy expectation than other
students."278
The court then quickly analyzed the character of the intrusion
found in the drug testing procedure, finding that because it
mirrored that used in Acton, its invasion of privacy was not
significant.279
Finally, the court looked to the nature and immediacy of the
governmental interest involved, the other half of the
reasonableness balancing test. The court quickly determined
that
given the paucity of evidence of an actual drug abuse
problem among those subject to the Policy, the
immediacy of the District's concern is greatly
diminished. And, without a demonstrated drug
abuse problem among the group being tested, the
efficacy of the District's solution to its perceived
problem is similarly greatly diminished.280
In the end, the court found that the governmental interest
was outweighed by the student's privacy interest and so the
policy was an unreasonable violation of the Fourth Amendment.28 '
8. Analysis
While the majority of the cases leading up to the Earls 1
decision were in favor of the drug testing policies examined, the
cases after that decision have overwhelmingly struck them
down.282 In fact, the reasoning behind these decisions has been
277 Id. (quoting

Sante Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000)).

278 Earls2, 242 F.3d at
1276.

Id.
Id. at 1277.
281 Id.
282 Keep in mind that Milligan was not an extracurricular
drug testing
279
280
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surprisingly similar.
The Linke and Theodore decisions found it important that the
particular state constitutions involved provided more protection
to an individual's privacy interest than the Fourth Amendment.
The Linke, Theodore, Gardner, Tannahill, and Earls 2 cases all
determined that the school district promulgating the drug testing
policy at issue had failed in demonstrating a true special need.
In each case, the court found it decisive that the district could not
show any correlation between the drug testing policy and a drug
problem within the student population tested. The Joy court
agreed with this and provided the same reasoning even though it
upheld a similar policy on merely precedential grounds.
These cases have also added to the judicial model proposed in
this article. The Joy case pointed out that the governmental
interest prong of the analysis should be analyzed from two
perspectives: "whether there is any correlation between the
defined population and the abuse, and whether there is any
correlation between the abuse and the government's interest in
protecting life and property. '283 In addition, the Tannahill court
provided two methods for establishing special needs; they can be
shown (1) "when the individual subject to the test performs
highly regulated functions concerning the public safety or special
governmental roles," or (2) "a school district can prove the
existence of a special need by showing exigent circumstances and
continued failure in attempts to alleviate the problem. 284
And finally, almost specifically contrary to the Chandler
decision's statement that a demonstrated problem of drug abuse
will not always be necessary in support of a drug testing
program,285 the Earls2 court stated that
any district seeking to impose a random
suspicionless drug testing policy as a condition to
participation in a school activity must demonstrate
that there is some identifiable drug abuse problem
case. It is included in this article mainly because it provides an additional look at
how another federal circuit follows the judicial model proposed in this article.
283 Joy, 212 F.3d. at 1064.
284 Tannahill, 133 F. Supp. 2d at
928.
285 Chandler, 520 U.S. at 319.
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among a sufficient number of those subject to the

testing, such that testing that group of students will
28 6
actually redress its drug problem.

Whether the Supreme Court followed these additional
clarifications to the judicial model will be discussed further on.28'
C. 2002 until Earls 3
At this point in the analysis, the Circuit split that led to the
Supreme Court addressing the validity of drug testing policies
affecting students in extracurricular activities is apparent. 288 The

Eighth Circuit found the policy in Miller to be reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment. The Tenth Circuit struck down a

286 Earls 2, 242 F.3d at 1278.
287 In 2001, the Supreme Court again addressed the
special needs doctrine

in the case of Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001). The Ferguson
case dealt with a hospital drug testing policy that tested obstetrics patients. The
court invalidated the drug testing program in this case because, contrary to its
decisions in Skinner, Von Raab, Vernonia, and Chandler wherein "the 'special
need' that was advanced as a justification for the absence of a warrant or
individualized suspicion was one divorced from the State's general interest in law
enforcement," in Ferguson, "the central and indispensable feature of the policy
from its inception was the use of law enforcement to coerce the patients into
substance abuse treatment." Id. at 79.
The Court also made clear that in these cases it did not simply accept
whatever the governmental entity put forth as a special need. Instead, the Court
"carried out a 'close review' of the scheme at issue before concluding that the need
in question was not 'special,' as that term has been defined in our cases." Id. at 81.
For more in-depth discussion of the Ferguson case, see Krislen Nalani
Chun, Casenote, Still Wondering After All These Years: Ferguson v. City Of
Charleston And The Supreme Court's Lack Of Guidance Over Drug Testing And
The Special Needs Doctrine, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 797 (2002); Note, A Decision
Without A Solution: Ferguson v. City Of Charleston, 53 S.C. L. REV. 717 (2002);
Steven R. Probst, Case Comment, Ferguson v. City Of Charleston: Slowly
Returning The "Special Needs" Doctrine To Its Roots, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 285
(2001); Rosemary Missisian, Note, The True Need Of The Special Needs Doctrine:
Individual Rights - Ferguson v. City Of Charleston, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 879 (2002);
Joseph S. Dowdy, Recent Development, Well Isn't That Special? The Supreme
Court's Immediate Purpose Of Restricting The Doctrine Of Special Needs In
Ferguson v. City Of Charleston,80 N.C. L. REV. 1050 (2002).
288 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Board of Educ. of Indep.
Sch.
Dist. No. 92 Of PottawatomieCounty v. Earls, 534 U.S. 1015 (2001).

HeinOnline -- 4 Tex. Rev. Ent. & Sports L. 51 2003

52

TEXAS REVIEW OF
ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW

[Vol. 4:1

similar policy in Earls 2.289 Finally, although the Seventh Circuit
upheld the policies in Todd and Joy, it clearly only did so in Joy
due to principles of stare decisis. Beyond this, the court spent a
significant amount of time showing why it otherwise disagreed
with its initial decision in Todd.
Before turning to the Supreme Court's resolution of this
confusion, the Linke and Joy cases came before the courts one
more time, and need to be discussed to finish this analysis of
judicial review of extracurricular drug testing policies.29 °
1. Linke v. Northwestern School Corp.2 91

On March 5, 2002, the Linke case reached the Supreme Court
of Indiana on the Linkes' appeal of the decision of the Indiana
Court of Appeals, Fifth District. Keep in mind that the district
court determined that the drug testing policy was unreasonable

In the Brooks case, the district court for the Southern District of Texas
struck down a similar policy. 730 F. Supp. 759. In 1991, the United States Court
289

of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed this decision without opinion. Brooks v.
East Chambers County Sch., 930 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1991). Because the Fifth
Circuit was affirming a case that took place before the Supreme Court's decisions
in Chandler and Acton, it is not included as part of the Circuit split noted in this
article.
290 One other case that need not be discussed in depth
is York v.
Wahkiahum Sch. Dist. No. 200, 40 P.3d 1198 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002), review denied,
56 P.3d 565 (Wash. 2002). The York case dealt with a drug testing policy that
tested students as a condition to participating in sports. In another permutation of
the judicial test, the Washington Court of Appeals stated that "[t]o determine
whether the special needs exception applies, a court examines the nature of the
privacy interest and the character and degree of the intrusion. Then the court
determines whether a compelling state interest justifies the intrusion and whether
the intrusion is a narrowly tailored means of serving the interest." Id. at 1200.
Unlike most of the courts discussed, this court used the reasonableness test in
order to establish special needs, instead of making the determination of special
needs the first part of the analysis.
In a surprisingly brief opinion, the court simply found that the plaintiffs
had not demonstrated that the policy invaded any substantial legal right enjoyed
by the student athletes tested. Id. However, because the district had stopped
testing pending trial, the court dismissed the plaintiffs claims as moot and
remanded the case for trial. Id. at 1199-1200.
291 763 N.E.2d 972 (Ind. 2002) (hereinafter Linke 2).
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under the Indiana Constitution.292
In previous cases, the Supreme Court of Indiana had
determined that an Indiana citizen's privacy rights protected
under the Indiana Constitution must be evaluated by analyzing
the totality of the circumstances by using a balancing test similar
to that in Acton.293 Therefore, on appeal the court made clear that
in its review of whether the drug testing policy was reasonable
under the Indiana Constitution, it would follow the approach
used by the United States Supreme Court in Acton.
The review began by looking at the nature of the privacy
interest held by the students involved. Following the U.S.
Supreme Court's reasoning, the court determined that due to the
supervision and control that a public school has over its students
and "in view of the legislature's codification of the custodial and
protective role of Indiana public schools, we find that students
are entitled to less privacy at school than adults would enjoy in
comparable situations. 294
Second, the court found the fact that students had to consent
to the policy very important, and it did not believe that such
consent took away from the voluntariness of the participation in
the testing. The court distinguished this case from Lopez because
in that case, a student's academic credit was impacted by a
decision not to be tested, while in this case students would only
be deprived of participating in extracurricular activities.2

95

The

court also explained that the "fact that refusal to agree to drug
testing results in forfeiture of the opportunity to obtain certain
benefits is not so weighty as to constitute forced consent.296
Third, the court found it very important that the students
involved had volunteered for an already regulated activity.
Pointing to Earls 2, the court noted, "non-athletic extracurricular
activities are also regulated in that various activities or clubs
impose rules and requirements to which participants must

292 Linke, 734 N.E.2d at
260.

293 Linke 2, 763 N.E.2d at 979.
294 Id. at 979.
295 Id. at 980.
296 Id. at 981.
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comply. '297 This extra regulation also diminished the privacy
interests involved.
After establishing that the students tested had lower
expectations of privacy than other students, the court then
turned to a review of the character of the intrusion caused by the
drug testing policy. The court mentioned several factors that
must be considered when reviewing this character, including the
type of testing involved, what the test searches for, the discretion
given to those who monitor the testing, the disclosure of the test
results, and whether the test is punitive or preventative and
rehabilitative.298 In analyzing all of these factors, the court found
that the policy in this case was "much less intrusive" than the
policy in Acton, 299 because: no students were compelled to provide
any additional information, they were only tested for a
prescreened set of drugs; school monitors were given no discretion
as to who to test or what to test for; test results were kept
confidential to a great extent; and the test results were not given
to law enforcement, instead they were used for rehabilitative
purposes.
As a result, "the care exhibited by [the school
corporation] to protect student privacy and to create a non3°°
punitive test mitigates against the Linkes' privacy concern."
Finally, the court considered the school corporation's interest
in promulgating the policy. The court found that "[d]eterring
drug abuse by children in school is an important and legitimate
concern for our schools," and the school corporation's "interest in
testing the included students is further heightened by the fact
that the relevant extracurricular activities all have off campus
components."3 1 In addition, even though there may not have
been legitimate safety concerns involved because the students
were not participating in athletic extracurricular activities, the
school held these students up as role models by submitting them
to extra regulations and sending them to community functions as

297

298
299
300

301

Id.
Linke 2, 763 N.E.2d at 982.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 983-84
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school representatives. 2
In essence, the school had "concrete
evidence of drug abuse by NSC junior and high school
students. ' '3o3
Therefore, by looking at the totality of the circumstances, the
court determined that the policy did not violate the Indiana
30 4
Constitution and vacated the decision of the trial court.
2. Penn-Harris-Madison School Corporation v. Joy30 5
Soon after the Linke 2 decision, the Joy case returned to the
Court of Appeals of Indiana, Fourth District. In the first Joy
decision discussed in this article, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit determined that the drug testing
policy reviewed was constitutional
under the Fourth
Amendment.3 0 6 After that decision, the first Linke decision came
down finding that the drug testing policy in that case was an
unreasonable violation of the Indiana Constitution.30 7 Thereafter,
the school corporation asked the Indiana Supreme Court to
transfer and consolidate the Joy dispute with Linke, which was
also subject to a petition to transfer.3 0 8 The Indiana Supreme
Court accepted transfer of the Linke case, but did not consolidate
the two cases in its ruling in Linke 2 as it found that the policy in
Linke did not violate the Indiana Constitution. The Court of
Appeals of Indiana, Fourth District then addressed the case in
light of this confusing precedent.
Following Linke 2, the court stated that in reviewing the drug
testing policy, it was required to look at "the totality of the
circumstances" and "'weigh the nature of the privacy interest
upon which the search intrudes, the character of the intrusion
that is complained of, and the nature and immediacy of the
' 30 9
governmental concern. '
302

303
304

305

Id. at 984.
Linke 2, 763 N.E.2d at 985.
Id.

768 N.E.2d 940 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (hereinafter Joy 2).
212 F.3d at 1065.

306 Joy,
307

308
309

Linke, 734 N.E.2d at 260.
Joy 2, 768 N.E.2d at 944.
Id. at 947 (quoting Linke 2, 763 N.E.2d at 979).
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In the first part of its balancing, the court followed Linke 2
and found that "the nature of the privacy interests upon which
the search intrudes parallels that in Linke," and so were lower
than that of other students.21°
Looking to the second factor, the character of the intrusion,
the court found that this case was different from Linke 2 because
students had to provide the monitor with medical information
about medication being taken before submitting to the testing. 11
However, because this information was also kept confidential, the
31 2
court found that "the additional invasion is not significant."
The court also noted that similar to the policy reviewed in Linke
2, the policy in this case was rehabilitative in nature, also
lessening the students' privacy interests. 3
Finally, the court looked to the nature and immediacy of the
governmental concern at stake. The court noted that the school
corporation had "evidence of a substantial and immediate drug
abuse problem among its students," and the students tested were
treated as role models and student representatives as in Linke
2.314 Therefore, the court found that the interest in this case was
similarly as strong as that exhibited in Linke 2.
In the end, the court found that in viewing the totality of the
circumstances, the policy in this case was "sufficiently similar to
the drug testing program examined in Linke to pass
constitutional muster."315
3. Analysis
The Linke 2 and Joy 2 cases both upheld the drug testing
policies reviewed after taking a look at the totality of the
circumstances and weighing the individual privacy interests
against the governmental interests involved. This totality of the
circumstances language is similar to the Supreme Court's overall
311

Id. at 948.

311

Id.

312

Id. at 949.

313 Joy 2, 768 N.E.2d at 949.
314
315

Id. at 950.
Id. at 951.
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look at all of the interests involved, characterized in the
reasonableness balancing test.
However, this can also be
misleading because the Supreme Court dictated that the analysis
should not be a mere look at the totality of the circumstances
involved; instead, the interests must be balanced against each
other. Therefore, if the privacy interest is stronger than the
governmental interest, the search is unconstitutional; while if the
government interest outweighs the privacy interest, the search is
constitutional. A simple look at the totality of the circumstances
may provide a misleading analysis of the constitutionality of the
search involved.
The Linke 2 case did provide a few interesting details that
may be seen as factors in the reasonableness balancing test part
of the judicial model-Step Two. The court noted that an
assessment of the nature of the privacy interest involves includes
three aspects: (1) the relationship of the individuals tested to the
State entity providing the test, (2) the voluntariness of the
consent to the testing program given by the individuals to be
tested, and (3) whether the individuals to be tested are
volunteering for a regulated activity. Although other courts have
peripherally mentioned each of these aspects of the privacy
interest, none were as clear in spelling them out.
The Linke 2 court also examined several factors to consider in
analyzing the character of the intrusion found in the testing: (1)
the type of test, (2) what the test searches for, (3) discretion given
to school officials in implementing the test, (4) disclosure of test
results, and (5) the punitive or rehabilitative/preventative nature
of the testing program. Different courts have addressed each of
these factors, but none has so explicitly laid out the factors as in
Linke 2.
The Joy 2 case is also interesting due to its convoluted
procedural history. The first Joy case discussed in this article
was the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit which begrudgingly upheld a testing policy on
precedential grounds even though finding that under an Acton
analysis it would not have upheld the policy. This later decision
in Joy 2 does not even remotely address the Seventh Circuit's
concerns, instead it blindly follows the Linke 2 decision and its
holding that the drug testing policy was reasonable and
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constitutional.

Even though these last two cases do not add to the Circuit
split already discussed, they again show the confusion courts
encounter when attempting to follow the judicial model, or parts
thereof, while reviewing a drug testing policy. The Linke 2 and
Joy 2 decisions are the last cases to be resolved before the
Supreme Court enters the picture as it reaches its decision in the
Earls litigation. It remains to be seen whether the United States
Supreme Court will follow the reasoning of these courts.
V. The Supreme Court Reviews an ExtracurricularDrug
Testing Policy
Before presenting an analysis of the Supreme Court's review
of an extracurricular drug testing policy, it is useful to recap the
decisions of the many courts that have addressed the issue so far.
To simplify the matter, only the most recent or final decision in
each case is presented. 16
The following five cases upheld extracurricular drug testing
policies as reasonable and constitutional:
*Todd v. Rush County Schools, United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (January 12,
1998)
*Millerv. Wilkes, United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit (March 31, 1999)
sJoy v. Penn-Harris-MadisonSchool Corporation,
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit (May 12, 2000)
.Linke v. Northwestern School Corp., Supreme Court
of Indiana (March 5, 2002)
*Penn-Harris-Madison,School Corporation, v. Joy,
Court of Appeals of Indiana, Fifth District (May 29,
17
2002)3
The York case is not included in this listing because the court never
reached the merits of the issue as the case was dismissed as moot.
317 This case and the Seventh Circuit's decision in Joy are included
as
316

HeinOnline -- 4 Tex. Rev. Ent. & Sports L. 58 2003

2003]

DRUG TESTING AT THE INTERSCHOLASTIC LEVEL

The following six cases held that similar policies were
unreasonable and unconstitutional:
*Brooks v. East Chambers ConsolidatedIndependent
School District, United States District Court for the
318
Southern District of Texas (August 23, 1989)
eTrinidad School District No. 1 v. Lopez, Supreme
Court of Colorado (June 29, 1998)
*Theodore v. Delaware Valley School District,
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania (November 6,
2000)
*Gardner v. Tulia Independent School District,
United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas (December 7, 2000)
*Tannahill v. Lockney Independent School District,
United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas (March 1, 2001)
*Earls v. Board of Education of Tecumseh Public
Schools District No. 92, United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (March 21, 2001)
Given that the eleven cases listed here are split almost exactly
down the middle, it is clear that the United States Supreme
Court needed to get involved in order to provide some clarity to
this issue.
1. Board of Education of Independent School District
No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls319
As described early on in this article, the Student Activities
Drug Testing Policy adopted by the Tecumseh School District
required all middle and high school students to consent to testing
in order to participate in extracurricular activities. Several
separate cases in this list due to the odd procedural history of the dispute as
already discussed.
318 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion in this case is not included
separately here as it simply affirmed this decision without opinion.
319 122 S.Ct. 2559 (2002) (hereinafter Earls3).
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students and their parents sued claiming that the policy violated
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The
district court followed the Supreme Court's Acton decision and
upheld the policy granting the school district summary
judgment.32 0 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this
decision holding instead that the school district needed to
demonstrate some identifiable drug problem among the group to
be tested before implementing a drug testing policy.3 21 The school
district then appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
Throughout the discussion of this case, reference will be made
both to the judicial model proposed earlier and the potential
additional considerations to this model that have developed in the
extracurricular cases in the last seven years.
The Court began with Step One of the judicial model, the
Special Needs Analysis. Unlike Earls 1 and Earls 2, the court did
not spend a significant amount of time discussing whether there
were appropriate special needs presented by the school district.
Instead, pointing to Acton and T.L.O., the Court noted that
"'special needs' inhere in the public school context," and "a finding
of individualized suspicion may not be necessary when a school
' 322
conducts drug testing."
Having found that there was a special need in this case, the
Court then moved to Step Two, the Reasonableness Balancing
Test. Moving to the first part of the balancing test, the Court
analyzed the student's privacy interest, noting "[a] student's
privacy interest is limited in a public school environment where
the State is responsible for maintaining discipline, health, and
safety."323 As several other cases had discussed,324 the students
argued that because they were not subject to regular physicals
320 Earls 1, 115 F. Supp. 2d at
1296.
321 Earls2, 242 F.3d at 1278.
322 Earls 3, 122 S.Ct. at 2564-65.
323 Id. at 2565 (quotingActon, 515

U.S. at 656).
e.g., Lopez, 963 P.2d at 1106-07 (finding that students who
participated in extracurricular activities had higher expectations of privacy the
Colorado Supreme Court focused on the "qualitatively different type of undressing
from the communal undressing" in Acton); Willis, 158 F.3d at 422 (finding the lack
of "communal undress" important to its determination that the students tested had
higher expectations of privacy than the student athletes in Acton).
324 See,
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and communal undress as the student athletes in Acton, they
should have a stronger privacy interest than student participants
in athletics.
However, the Court made clear that the
"distinction.. .was not essential to our decision.. .which
depended primarily upon the school's custodial responsibility and
authority. ' 325

Instead, the Court agreed that students who

participate in extracurricular activities "subject themselves to
many of the same intrusions on their privacy as do athletes,"
including some aspects of off-campus travel and communal
undress, along with rules and requirements that do not apply to
other students.326 Therefore, agreeing with the Earls 1 decision,
the Supreme Court concluded that the students subject to the
Tecumseh testing policy also "have a limited expectation of
privacy."

327

The Court then moved to the second part of the first half of
the balancing test, a look at the character of the intrusion on
these privacy rights imposed by the drug testing policy. The
Court found that the policy in Earls was almost identical to that
in Acton except that male students were provided with even more
privacy because they were allowed to produce their samples
behind the bathroom stall door.3

28

Therefore, the method used in

this case was "even less problematic" than the negligible
intrusion in Acton. 29
In addition, the test results were kept confidential and were
only used to potentially bar a student from participation in a
privileged activity-extracurricular activities. Therefore, again
agreeing with the decisions in Earls 1 and Earls 2, "[g]iven the
minimally intrusive nature of the sample collection and the
limited uses to which the test results are put, we conclude that
the invasion of students' privacy is not significant.

30

The Court then moved to the second part of the balancing test,
an assessment of the nature and immediacy of the governmental
325 Earls3, 122 S.Ct. at 2565.
326 Id. at 2565-66.
327
328
329

Id. at 2566.
Id.
Id.

330 Earls 3, 122 S.Ct. at
2567.
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concern at issue and the efficacy of the testing policy in meeting
this concern. Initially, the Court pointed out that the "health and
safety risks identified in Vernonia apply with equal force to
Tecumseh's children."331 Keep in mind that the Tenth Circuit had
determined that the school district had presented a "paucity of
evidence" that the students tested in this case were using drugs
and so it found that there was no immediate governmental
concern presented. 32 The Supreme Court disagreed as it found
that the school district "presented specific evidence of drug use at
Tecumseh schools."333 The Court pointed to testimony by teachers
that suspected students were under the influence of drugs,
marijuana found in the school parking lot, drugs found in a
student's car and the concern of the community that the school
district had a drug situation. The Court would not second-guess
the district court's decision that "'it cannot be reasonably
disputed that the [School District]' ' 4 was faced with a 'drug
problem' when it adopted the Policy. 3
The Earls 2 court had determined that school districts that
wish to implement drug testing policies must "demonstrate that
there is some identifiable drug abuse problem among a sufficient
number of those subject to the testing, such that testing that
group of students will actually redress its drug problem." 35 The
Supreme Court disagreed. Pointing to its decision in Chandler,
the Court noted "this Court has not required a particularized or
pervasive drug problem before allowing the government to
conduct suspicionless drug testing. 3 36 Moreover, "the need to
prevent and deter the substantial harm of childhood drug 337use
provides the necessary immediacy for a school testing policy."
Similar to the Miller court,338 the Supreme Court would not
331

Id.

332

Earls 2, 242 F.3d at 1277.
122 S.Ct. at 2567.

333 Earls 3,
334

Id. (quoting Earls 1, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 1287).

335 Earls2, 242 F.3d at 1278.
336 Earls3, 122 S.Ct. at 2568.
337

Id.

In Miller, the Eight Circuit stated that "[wie see no reason that a
school district should be compelled to wait until there is a demonstrable problem
with substance abuse among its own students before the district is constitutionally
338

HeinOnline -- 4 Tex. Rev. Ent. & Sports L. 62 2003

2003]

DRUG TESTING AT THE INTERSCHOLASTIC LEVEL

force a school or school district to wait until a large proportion of
its student population uses drugs before implementing a testing
policy.3 39 Specifically, the Court stated that "[a]s we cannot
articulate a threshold level of drug use that would suffice to
justify a drug testing program for schoolchildren, we refuse to
fashion what would in effect be a constitutional quantum of drug
340
use necessary to show a 'drug problem.'
Pointing to Skinner and Von Raab, the students also argued
that health and safety considerations are also a crucial factor in
support of a drug testing program. Therefore, because the
students contesting the drug testing policy were not athletes,
there were no safety concerns in support of the policy. The Court
agreed that such safety concerns were important but found that
"the safety interest furthered by drug testing is undoubtedly the
substantial for all children, athletes and nonathletes alike. 341
The students also argued that the school district should have
used a method of individualized suspicion because this method
would be less intrusive than drug testing. The Court made clear
that this was not the case as "this Court has repeatedly stated
that reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment does not
require employing the least intrusive means."342
And finally, remember that the Earls 2 court found that the
drug testing policy was not an effective means of combating the
drug problem in the school district because there was no
demonstrated evidence of a drug problem among the students
tested.3 The Supreme Court again disagreed, finding instead
that "testing students who participate in extracurricular
activities is a reasonably effective means of addressing the School
District's legitimate concerns in preventing, deterring, and
detecting drug use."344 Many other courts had focused upon the
close nexus between the testing program and a particular
permitted to take measures that will help protect its schools against the sort of
'rebellion"'found inActon." 172 F.3d at 581.
339 Earls 3, 122 S.Ct. at 2568.
340

Id.

341 Id.
342

Id. at 2569.

343Earls 2, 242 F.3d at 1278.
344 Earls3, 122 S.Ct. at

2569.
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problem of drug abuse among those tested, as in Acton,3 45 but the

Supreme Court stated that "such a finding was not essential to
our holding" in Acton.A6 Instead, the Court explained that Acton,
"did not require the school to test the group of students most
likely to use drugs, but rather considered the constitutionality of
the program in the context of the public school's custodial
responsibilities.,,347

In the end, because the students tested possessed limited
privacy rights, the intrusion on these rights as a result of the
testing was not significant, and the government interest in
protecting students from problems associated with drug use was
important and legitimate, the Court concluded that "Tecumseh's
Policy is a reasonable means of furthering the School District's
important interest in preventing and deterring drug use among
its schoolchildren," and reversed the decision of the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals. 48
2. Analysis
The Supreme Court's decision in Earls 3 follows the Acton
case and to a large extent the judicial model proposed earlier.
One interesting way to determine whether the Supreme Court's
decision clarifies the confusing line of cases already discussed is
by looking at how the Earls 3 court would address the concerns
presented in the earlier cases that struck down similar drug
testing policies.
a. Earlier decisions
The cases already discussed that found that similar drug
345 See,

e.g., Joy, 212 F.3d at 1063-64 (arguing that the school district
needed to show some correlation between the students being tested and actual
abuse among those students) and Tannahill, 133 F.Supp.2d at 928-929 (arguing
that general concerns about a drug problem were not enough; instead the school
district needed to present evidence of an actual problem among the students being
tested).
346 Earls 3, 122 S.Ct.
at 2569.

Id.
Id. The case was then vacated and remanded in Earls v. Board
of
Educ. of Tecumseh Pub. Sch. Dist., 300 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2002).
347
348
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testing policies violated the Fourth Amendment came to this
conclusion for a variety of reasons.
1. Brooks
The Brooks case was resolved before the Supreme Court's
Acton and Chandler decisions and so its reasoning is not as
applicable to the present analysis. However, the court did focus
on the fact that the school district did not provide evidence that
the students being tested were part of the perceived drug abuse
problem.3 49 This same lack of evidence in support of a problem
among the group tested became the crux of the decisions that
followed in striking down similar policies.
2. Lopez
In Lopez, the Supreme Court of Colorado found it important
that there was not an aspect of communal undress and that the
policy applied to for-credit activities.3 50 The court also found that
the school district did not show that the students tested were
drug users or part of the drug problem.3 51 Therefore, because it
focused on the fact that the students tested had higher
expectations of privacy than student athletes, and because the
policy was not efficacious in testing a group that had a
demonstrated a drug abuse problem, it struck down the testing
policy.
3. Theodore
In Theodore, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania found
that the Pennsylvania Constitution provided stronger protection
to students than the Fourth Amendment.3 52 However, the court
struck down the testing policy because it also determined that the
school district had not presented evidence of problem of drug use
349
350

351
352

Brooks, 730 F. Supp. at 764.
Lopez, 963 P.2d at 1106-07.
Id. at 1109.
Theodore, 761 A.2d at 656.
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4&5. Gardner and Tannahill
In Gardner, the district court for the Northern District of
Texas found that there was no connection between any drug
abuse problem among students in extracurricular activities and
the need for354a testing policy, and therefore struck down the
testing policy.

A little over three months later, in Tannahill, the same court
stated that "general concerns about maintaining drug-free
schools or desires to detect illegal conduct are insufficient... to
demonstrate the existence of special needs." 355

This court also

compared the privacy interests of the students involved to those
of student athletes, finding them higher. 56 In the end, this court
also struck down the testing policy.
6. Earls 2
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals also struck down the
testing policy mainly because it found that the school district had
not presented specific evidence of a drug abuse problem among
the students tested. 7 It tied this lack of evidence to the efficacy
of the testing policy, finding that because there was not a proven
governmental concern to test the particular students it could not
be efficacious to test them to combat this perceived problem. 58
b. Clarification
The Supreme Court's decision in Earls 3 clarifies how all of
these courts were mistaken in several ways.

313 Id. at 661.
3,4 Gardner,183 F. Supp. 2d at
859.
355 Tannahill, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 928.
356 Id. at 929.
357
358

Earls 2, 242 F.3d at 187.

Id.
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1. Special needs
Initially, contrary to Tannahill, the Court made very clear
that the "general concerns" for maintaining drug free schools and
the protection of the health and safety of children in these schools
was enough of a special need to justify the testing.35 9 In fact, the
Court did not spend a significant amount of time assessing the
special needs question in the Earls 3 decision; instead, it simply
echoed its findings in Acton, and earlier in T.L.O., that special
3 0
needs do exist in the public school context.
2. Evidence of a problem
All of the cases that struck down drug testing policies
focused on what they perceived as a lack of evidence supporting a
drug problem among students participating in extracurricular
activities.
The Supreme Court makes clear that this is
misguided. The Court would not set some "threshold level of
drug use" that would somehow be enough to constitute evidence
of a problem because it found that drug abuse in schools is a
serious and pervasive problem.3 61 The Court explicitly rejected
the Tenth Circuit's test that a school district must provide some
evidence of a problem among a particular group in order to test
them.
Another aspect to this issue is that several courts argued that
school districts could not implement a drug testing policy without
demonstrating that a drug abuse problem did exist.3 62 The
Supreme Court made clear that school districts did not need to
present evidence of a problem "before allowing the government to
conduct suspicionless searches."363
In fact, the Court notes that it had already elaborated upon
this point in Chandler. In that case, the Court acknowledged
that evidence of a drug problem would shore up an assertion of
special need, however, such evidence was not "in all cases
359 Earls3, 122 S. Ct. at 2564.

Id.
Id. at 2568.
362 See supra note 338 and accompanying
text.
363 Id.
360
361
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necessary to the validity of the testing regime."36 4 The Earls 3
Court reiterates this point that so many courts had
misunderstood.
3. Individual privacy interest
The cases that struck down the extracurricular drug testing
policies all compared the privacy interests of those tested to the
student athletes in Acton. Therefore, in comparison to those
student athletes, the students who participate in other
extracurricular activities have heightened expectations of
privacy. This heightened expectation then was the first part of
tipping the scale against the governmental interest in support of
the policy.
The Supreme Court would not make this type of comparison.
Instead of somehow comparing students in Earls to the student
athletes in Acton, the court focused instead on the regulations
that the students in extracurricular activities are subject to
because the focus of their analysis was the "school's custodial
responsibility and authority. '36 5 The Court would not set levels of
privacy according to the type of student involved.
VI. Interpretation of the Earls 3 Decision
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Earls 3
established that in some situations suspicionless drug testing of
students in extracurricular activities at the interscholastic public
school level is reasonable and constitutional. The extent of this
decision and its impact on the educational landscape is still open
to debate.
A. Judicial interpretation of Earls 3
One way to begin to understand the impact of the Earls 3
decision is by briefly looking at two cases that followed and
interpreted the case.

364 Chandler, 520 U.S. at 319.
315 Id. at 2565.
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1. Marchwinski v. Howard 36
The Marchwinski case dealt with a drug testing policy applied
to people eligible for or receiving welfare assistance. The facts of
the case are not pertinent to the present analysis. However, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit did discuss
the Earls 3 decision in reaching its result that the drug testing
policy was supported by a special need.36 7
Relying on Chandler, the plaintiffs argued that only a very
strong public safety rationale could qualify as a special need in
support of a drug testing program.3 68 The plaintiffs pointed to
language in Chandler that seemed to imply that only a
substantial public safety concern can support special needs. As
the Chandler court said, "'[wihere the risk to public safety is
substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to
the risk may rank as 'reasonable'. . . But where, as in this case,
public safety is not genuinely in jeopardy, the Fourth
Amendment precludes the suspicionless search.' 369
The Sixth Circuit did not agree "that this language stands for
the broad proposition that special needs are limited to urgent
public safety concerns." 37° Instead, following Earls 3 and Acton, it
noted "although public safety must be a component of a state's
special need, it need not predominate." 371 Therefore, according to
the Sixth Circuit, the standard should be "whether [the State]
has shown a special need, of which public safety is but one
consideration. 372
2. Joye v. Hunterdon Central Regional High School
373
Board of Education
The Joye case involved claims by students
366

309 F.3d 330 (6th Cir. 2002).
at 335.
Id. at 334.
Id. (quoting Chandler,520 U.S. at 323).

367 Id.
368
369

370 Id.

371 Marchwinski, 309
372

373

F.3d at 335.
Id.
803 A.2d 706 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).
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extracurricular activities who again sued a school board claiming
that a drug testing policy applied to them was unconstitutional.
Similar to the Theodore and Linke cases discussed earlier,374 the
trial court determined that the New Jersey Constitution provided
greater protections to the students' privacy interests. 75 The trial
court also found that the school board did not demonstrate a
substantial special need showing a drug problem among the
students tested to override these privacy rights. 76 The school
board then appealed.
In reviewing the trial court's decision, the Superior Court of
New Jersey, Appellate Division, closely followed the Earls 3
decision. The Superior Court noted that the program
implemented in this case "involves the same type of program as
that involved in Earls, both with respect to the students tested
and the procedure used. 377 Therefore, following Earls 3, there
was "no room for debate about the breath or scope of the United
States Supreme Court's opinion or the validity of the Hunterdon

Central drug testing program under the Federal Constitution.371
The real issue for the court was then to determine whether it had
to reach a different result under the New Jersey Constitution.
Although the trial court had determined that the New Jersey
Constitution offered greater privacy protection to the students
tested, the Appellate Division found that
we see nothing in the history or background of the
State
Constitution to warrant
a different
interpretation on this question, at least when it
comes to the legitimate expectation of privacy among
school children. To the contrary, the courts of New
Jersey, to date, seem to follow the federal Supreme
Linke, 734 N.E.2d 252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (finding that the Indiana
Constitution provides stronger protection for privacy rights than the Fourth
Amendment) and Theodore, 761 A.2d 652 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) (finding similarly
that the Pennsylvania Constitution provides stronger protection for privacy rights
than the Fourth Amendment).
375 Joye, 803 A.2d at
707.
376 Id.
377 Id. at 712.
374

378

Id.
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Court when dealing with issues of drug testing.37 9
In fact, the court pointed to several cases wherein the
Supreme Court of New Jersey "looked to the Federal Constitution
and United States Supreme Court opinions, and utilized the
'special needs' balancing approach for evaluating reasonableness
38 °
that was discussed by Justice Thomas in Earls."
Therefore, the court found no basis for coming to a different
conclusion under the New Jersey Constitution and reversed and
381
remanded the decision to the trial court.
B. Communal Undress
In trying to create a distinction between the drug testing
policy reviewed by the Supreme Court in Acton and the policies
they were reviewing, several courts focused on the Court's
"communal undress" language. Following the Schaill decision,
the Acton court stated that the "'element of 'communal undress'
inherent in athletic participation,' 382 was an important factor in
its determination that the student athletes involved had lowered
expectations of privacy than other students.
The Lopez court focused on this language and found that the
students' participation in extracurricular activities "indicates a
qualitatively different type of undressing from the communal
undressing" in Acton. 83 This difference was an important factor
in the Supreme Court of Colorado's conclusion that the students
tested had higher expectations of privacy than student athletes,
and that this higher expectation could not be outweighed by the
school district's interest in support of the testing program.
The Willis court similarly focused on this language, finding
that there was not a similar element of communal undress
apparent in the students tested in this case who were not student
athletes.84 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found this to be
9 Id. at 714.
380 Joye, 803 A.2d at 714.
381

Id. at 714-15.

382

Acton, 515 U.S. at 657.

383 Lopez, 963 P.2d at 1107.
311

Willis, 158 F.3d at 422.
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important in distinguishing the students' privacy interest as
higher than student athletes.
On the other hand, in Earls 2 the Tenth Circuit would not
focus on this communal undress language because it doubted that
the Supreme Court intended "that the level of privacy expectation
depends upon the degree to which particular students, or groups
of students, dress or shower together or, on occasion, share
sleeping or bathroom facilities while on occasional out-of-town
trips."38 This is one of the few areas where the Supreme Court
agreed with the Tenth Circuit as it said that the language
discussing communal undress "was not essential to our
decision... which depended primarily upon the school's custodial
386
responsibility and authority.
Therefore, although thinking that they were following the
Acton decision, courts have been wrong to merely focus on the
exact nature of the type of activity that students participate in.
Instead, courts must first recognize that the Supreme Court's
Acton and Earls 3 decisions found that the students' privacy
interests were limited in the first instance due to their
attendance at a public school before looking to the types of
activities that the students are involved in.
C. Rights of Students in Public Schools
In 1985, the T.L.O. court determined that school officials did
not need to follow the strict requirements of individualized
suspicion and a warrant because "the legality of a search of a
student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all
the circumstances, of the search."387 The Court added that this
focus on reasonableness "will spare teachers and school
administrators the necessity of schooling themselves in the
niceties of probable cause and permit them to regulate their
conduct according to the dictates of reason and common sense. "3,8
This is the language that the Acton court pointed to in finding
385 Earls 2,

242 F.3d at 1275.
S.Ct. at 2565.
T.L.O., 469 U.S.at 340.
Id. at 343.

386 Earls3, 122
387
388
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that special needs existed in the public school context, obviating
the necessity for a warrant or individualized suspicion in support
of the drug testing program testing student athletes. 3 9 The Acton
court then looked at the nature of the privacy rights held by
students in public schools and found that "the teachers and
administrators of those schools stand in loco parentis over the
children entrusted to them,"39° and "while children assuredly do
not 'shed their constitutional rights ... at the schoolhouse gate,'
the nature of those rights is what is appropriate for children in
school." 391 Therefore, as already discussed, the Court determined
that students at public schools already have a lesser expectation
of privacy than other individuals in general and other students in
particular. This privacy interest is further diminished because
exams due to the
they are subject to vaccinations and medical
3 92
them.
over
relationship
school's custodial
The Earls 3 court reiterated this conclusion. It noted "[a]
student's privacy interest is limited in a public school
environment where the State is responsible for maintaining
discipline, health, and safety."393 Therefore, even without any
participation in extracurricular activities, athletic or otherwise,
students in public schools will be found to have lesser
expectations of privacy than other students and the general
public at large.
D. Character of the Intrusion
In Acton, male students were tested by producing a sample at
a urinal in a bathroom while a school monitor stood behind them.
Female students produced samples in a closed stall with a
monitor waiting outside. In analyzing the character of this
intrusion on the students' privacy interests, the Court stated,
"[t]hese conditions are nearly identical to those typically
encountered in public restrooms, which men, women, and
especially schoolchildren use daily. Under such conditions, the
389Acton, 515
390

391
392

U.S. at 653.

Id.
Id. at 655-56.
Id. at 656.

393Earls 3, 122 S.Ct. at 2565 (quotingActon, 515 U.S. at 656).
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privacy interests compromised by the process of obtaining the
urine sample are in our view negligible. 394
Virtually every other court since this decision has agreed,
finding that because the testing policies reviewed were similar to
that in Acton, they also were negligible intrusions on the privacy
interests of the students tested.
One court that disagreed was the Supreme Court of Colorado
in Lopez. The Lopez court questioned how this type of conduct
could be classified as a negligible intrusion on someone's privacy
interests as it said
Ordinarily, a student has some choice about when to
use the rest room and when to urinate. The fact
that one student was not able to urinate after
several attempts because he was too embarrassed
underscores this point. Ordinarily, a student does
not have an official monitor, a person whose sole
purpose is to prevent the student from altering the
student's urine sample, listening to (and perhaps
watching from behind) the student urinating.
Ordinarily, a student does not have to urinate into a
container and present his or her urine sample to a
school district representative for temperature
assessment, labeling, and preparation for analysis.
Ordinarily, a student urinates simply because the
body requires it, not because a school district insists
that the student provide a urine sample on demand
in order for the school district to search it for the
presence of drugs. 95
One cannot help but sympathize with these concerns.
Regardless of these concerns, the Earls 3 court simply equated
the drug testing procedure testing extracurricular students with
the procedure testing student athletes in Acton, and because
every student in Earls 3 was allowed to produce his or her sample
behind a closed door, the Court found that the policy was "even

394Acton,
395 Lopez,

515 U.S. at 658.
963 P.2d at 1108.
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less problematic" than the one in Acton.396
This does not necessarily mean that any testing policy will be
found to be such a negligible intrusion. A good example of a
policy that still may not pass constitutional muster is found in
the Brooks case where students were required to come to the
principal's office to produce their sample in the principal's own
bathroom.3 97 A truly invasive policy that would ask a student to
produce a sample in full view of a school official may also be so
different from the policies in Acton and Earls 3 that it will be
found to be a significant intrusion.
Still, school districts that want to implement a drug testing
program would be wise to set up a program similar to that in
Acton or Earls 3. As long as the policy is in a public school
district, it should be free from classification as a significant
intrusion on a student's privacy rights.
E. Deterrence or Prevention
Another important issue that concerned many of the courts
was the perception that school districts were implementing drug
testing policies to combat a drug abuse problem that they could
not yet show existed. Because in their perception the Supreme
Court had mandated that such policies could only be
implemented if there were an epidemic level drug abuse problem,
several courts struck down drug testing policies because they did
not believe that the school district involved could present
evidence of an actual drug problem among the students that it
wanted to test. 98
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Miller was one of the
first courts to recognize that evidence of an epidemic level
problem was not necessary before a school district could
implement a drug testing policy. The court realized that a school
district should not be "be compelled to wait until there is a
demonstrable problem with substance abuse among its own
396
397
398

Earls3, 122 S.Ct. at 2566.
Brooks, 730 F. Supp. 762.
See, e.g.,, Theodore, 761 A.2d at 661; Gardner, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 859;

Tannahill, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 928.
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students before the district is constitutionally permitted to take
measures that will help protect its schools." 399 The Earls 1 court
agreed that it would be "rather anomalous to require school
officials to await an epidemic before taking peremptory
measures. 400
In setting out two perspectives from which to analyze a
sufficient governmental interest justifying special needs,4 1 in Joy
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, finding instead
that the school district therein had "not established that any
immediate problem with drugs or alcohol exists for its students in
extracurricular activities. '4°
As a result, this governmental
interest was outweighed by the students' privacy interest and but
for stare decisis grounds, the court would have overturned the
policy at issue.
In Earls 2, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals took this to the
extreme by establishing a rule that "any district seeking to
impose a random suspicionless drug testing policy as a condition
to participation in a school activity must demonstrate that there
is some identifiable drug abuse problem among a sufficient
number of those subject to the testing."4 3
The Supreme Court made clear in Earls 3 that this fascination
with a particular level of proof, and specifically the standard
proposed by the Tenth Circuit, was incorrect. The Court noted
"this Court has not required a particularized or pervasive drug
problem before allowing the government to conduct suspicionless
drug testing."40 4 Moreover, it would not set a threshold level of
drug abuse that would be sufficient to support a drug testing
program.4 5 Instead it found that prevention of harm to the school
children tested was sufficient to demonstrate the necessity of
406
implementing a drug testing policy.
399 Miller, 172 F.3d at 581.
401

Earls 1, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 1288.
See supra pp. 39-42, 55-56.

402

Id. at 1065.

403

Earls2, 242 F.3d at 1278.

400

404 Earls3, 122 S.Ct. at
2568.
405

Id.

406

Id.
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This reasoning is one of the most difficult to comprehend.
Following the Earls 3 decision, it seems that any school district
that can provide some evidence of a drug problem among some of
its students, or that can at least provide that there is a legitimate
concern about drug use in its community, will be able to show an
immediate enough problem in support of the implementation of a
drug testing program.
This conclusion may be easier to understand in the context of
the relationship of public school children to their schools. As the
Supreme Court has repeatedly found, a school sits in the position
of the children's parents, or in loco parentis, while the students
are in school or participating in school-related activities. The
school is responsible for their well-being while the students are at
school or involved in school activities. Therefore, because the
Supreme Court has also repeatedly found that the drug problem
is especially dangerous to school children, the immediate need to
combat this problem flows out of the school district's
responsibility to these students in the first instance.
F. Efficacy
Considerations as to the type of evidence that will be
sufficient to demonstrate a substantial governmental interest in
support of a drug testing program are intertwined with an
analysis of whether a drug testing program is effective in
combating the problem of drug abuse in public schools.
Several courts found that such policies were not effective
because there was no evidence that the extracurricular students
tested were students that were part of any drug abuse problem. °7
Most interestingly, in Linke, the Indiana Court of Appeals stated
that the Supreme Court's "suggested case-by-case approach to
determine which groups of students may be randomly tested
under the Fourth Amendment has failed, '4°8 because courts were
upholding drug testing policies even though there was no
evidence that the students tested were drug users. The Brooks
and Lopez courts also noted that "logic would dictate that
407

See, e.g., Lopez, 963 P.2d at 122; Joy, 212 F.3d at 1065.

408

Linke, 734 N.E.2d at 259-60.
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students who participate in athletics and other extra-curricular
activities are, in fact, less likely to use drugs and alcohol,9
because normally they have "better discipline records and
performed better academically than did students in the general
410
population."
Although this last point may be true, the Supreme Court did
not find the efficacy of the drug testing policy to be so
problematic. Not only did the Earls 3 Court find that testing
students who participate in extracurricular activities was "an
effective means" to address the school districts legitimate
concerns in preventing and combating the drug problem, the
Court also clarified that it had never required schools to only test
the group of students most likely to use drugs, instead drug
testing policies must be analyzed "in the context of the public
school's custodial responsibilities. 41 '
In the end, as most students at the interscholastic level
participate in some form of extracurricular activity, a testing
policy testing these same students may actually test the majority
of all of the students in a school district. Therefore, following the
Supreme Court's reasoning, it may be most efficacious to test this
group because virtually all students who could be drug users will
be covered.
G. Privileged Participation
At the interscholastic level, participation in athletics or any
other extracurricular activities is a privilege. This participation
is not a right in that students can not sue a school district or
school officials who keep them from participating in an
extracurricular activity when they refuse to be drug tested. The
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recognized as much in 1987 in
Schaill when it said that participation "is a benefit.. .It is not
unreasonable to couple these benefits with an obligation to
412
undergo drug testing.'
409

Brooks, 730 F. Supp. at 343.

410 Lopez, 963 P.2d at 1109.
411
412

Earls 3, 122 S.Ct. at 2569.
Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1320.
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Justice Ginsburg makes an interesting point about the nature
of extracurricular activities in her dissent to Earls 3. Ginsburg
notes that extracurricular activities are "part of the school's
educational program," and that participation in these activities
"is a key component to school life, essential in reality for students
applying to college, and, for all participants, a significant
contributor to the breadth and quality of the educational
experience. 413
The Lopez court echoed Justice Ginsburg's
concerns as it noted that "the reality for many students who wish
to pursue post-secondary educational training and/or professional
vocations requiring experience garnered only by participating in
extracurricular
activities is that they must engage in such
"414

activities .

These statements lead some readers, or more importantly
some students at the interscholastic level, to believe that
participation in extracurricular activities is anything but a
privilege.
Still, to this point, although some courts have
recognized the importance of such participation, no courts have
found that students have a constitutional right to participate in
athletics or other extracurricular activities.
H. The State of the Judicial Model
The Supreme Court's decision in Earls 3 almost explicitly
followed the judicial model proposed in this article. However,
throughout this analysis other courts have provided additional
41 5
considerations that were not in the original judicial model.
While these considerations may have some bearing within the
particular jurisdictions concerned, the Supreme Court has not
explicitly adopted any of them. In fact, as already stated, the
Court specifically disagreed with the Tenth Circuit's new
standard of proof demonstrating a special need and in support of
a governmental interest in promotion of drug testing.
In the end, the proposed judicial model still stands as a
413
414
415

Earls3, 122 S.Ct. at 2573 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Lopez, 963 P.2d at 1109.
See supra extra considerations provided in the Joy, Tannahill and

Earls 2 cases discussed pp. 39-42, 46-51. See supra extra considerations provided
in the Linke 2 case discussed pp. 52-58.
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representation of the Supreme Court's standard in assessing drug
testing programs within its special need doctrine.
VII. Conclusion
This article has taken an in-depth look at the many cases
reviewing the issue of drug testing students who wish to
participate in extracurricular activities at the interscholastic
level. Throughout its jurisprudence over the past two decades,
the Supreme Court has developed a method courts can follow to
review such testing policies. The judicial model proposed in this
article is a representation that consolidates the different factors
that the Supreme Court has discussed in these cases. Courts
have followed this model in various ways, culminating in the
Supreme Court's clear adherence to the model in its latest review
of an extracurricular drug testing policy in Earls 3.
The Supreme Court's Earls 3 decision mandates that similar
testing policies of students in public schools are constitutional.
The question that remains unanswered is the extent of this
mandate. In other words, can a public school district simply test
all of its students? As the Joy case noted, "the case has yet to be
made that a urine sample can be the 'tuition' at a public school." 4' 6
School districts will find some support for an extensive drug
testing program testing all students in Acton and Earls 3, both of
which were grounded in the recognition that there is a special in
loco parentisrelationship between students at a public school and
school officials. This relationship was paramount in the Supreme
Court's finding that student athletes and students in
extracurricular activities have lowered expectations of privacy,
and that the drug testing policies were effective means to combat
the drug problems in the particular school districts because they
focused on ferreting out drug use among the students themselves.
However, keep in mind that both decisions made it clear that
the students who were being tested had lower expectations of
privacy than students in general-part of Step Two of the judicial
model. While the Supreme Court has also noted that any student
in a public school has a diminished expectation of privacy than
416

Joy, 212 F.3d at 1067.
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that of adults or students in private schools, the actual extent of
this diminished privacy right has not been explored. One must
remember that the Supreme Court found it very important that
student athletes and students who participate in other
extracurricular activities are also subject to additional forms of
regulation that also diminish their expectations of privacy.
Students who do not participate in these activities may not be
subject to similar regulation and so their expectations of privacy
may be stronger.
From the perspective of a school district, because it can
implement a drug testing policy that covers all students in any
extracurricular activities, it may already cover the overwhelming
majority of students in the district as most participate in some
type of extracurricular activity. The problem is that the students
who participate in extracurricular activities may not always be
the students most susceptible to the problem of drug abuse
because such abuse would impair their abilities to perform in
these activities and could lead to their dismissal from the
activities themselves.
While the judicial model proposed in this article serves as a
framework for analyzing any drug testing policy proposed by a
school district, it cannot answer the question as to the extent of
the privacy interest possessed by students who do not participate
in any activities. Still, all of the other considerations of this
model would be the same as those discussed in Acton and Earls 3.
Following Step One, the Court has made it clear that there is a
special need in the public school context. Under Step Two as long
as the policy proposed was similar to that in Acton or Earls 3 its
character should not be significantly intrusive, and the school
district will most likely be able to demonstrate an immediate
governmental interest in fighting the drug problem as shown in
dealing with student athletes and extracurricular students. The
focus of the issue would then be on the actual privacy interest
possessed by this new category of student, these "other" students
in our public schools.
In the end, the students who may be in the most need of
rehabilitation due to drug use may be exactly those students who
are not significantly involved in the culture of the school itself by
being involved in any extracurricular activities. While the
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Supreme Court has not answered the question as to whether an
all encompassing drug testing policy will withstand constitutional
scrutiny, it seems clear that its precedent from Acton to Earls 3
has already found that students with a higher expectation of
privacy (extracurricular participants) can be tested in the same
way as those with lesser expectations of privacy (student
athletes). It does not seem to be an extreme step to take the
analysis to its logical end and find that students with an even
higher expectation of privacy (students who do not participate in
any activities) can also be tested because even they have
diminished privacy rights while attending public school.
Time will tell whether providing a urinalysis sample becomes
the "tuition" for attending public schools in the United States.
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